scholarly journals The role of retailer's app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Musen Xue
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Pareto Improvement ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

The role of retailer's ability to add app channel in a supply chain with quality decision and different power structures is investigated in this paper. Applying a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, under certain conditions, retailer's ability to add app channel can induce the manufacturer to adjust the wholesale price and product quality in the opposite direction with the manufacturer being the leader. Second, for the manufacturer and the retailer, retailer's ability to add app channel can result in two distinct profit situations regardless of the power structure of supply chain: win-win and lose-win. Moreover, in a retailer-led supply chain, adding app channel will make the whole supply chain better off when the return cost is relatively low or high, while make the whole supply chain worse off when the return cost is moderate. Third, we identify a region of the return cost under which the manufacturer, the retailer, the supply chain and consumers can gain from adding app channel, leading to a Pareto improvement.

Supply chain encroachment with quality decision and different power structures

2020 ◽  
Vol 54 (3) ◽  
pp. 693-718
Author(s):  
Musen Xue ◽  
Jianxiong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Choice ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Direct Channel ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Quality Investment ◽  
Quality Decision ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

This paper studies a supply chain with manufacturer encroachment and different power structures where product quality is an endogenous decision. We investigate the effects of encroachment and power structure on quality and profits for chain members. Employing a game-theoretic approach, we find that, first, in a manufacturer-led supply chain, encroachment makes both manufacturer and retailer better off when the quality investment efficiency is relatively high. And, the manufacturer’s profit exhibits nonmonotonicity with respect to the extent of consumers acceptance on the direct channel in a retailer-led setting. Second, our result shows that the pure equilibrium outcomes are driven by the quality investment efficiency and the extent of consumers’ acceptance on the direct channel. An interesting result is that, for the manufacturer, establishing encroachment channel and occupying the leader position simultaneously are always not the optimal choice. Additionally, the options of encroaching and striving for leader position can lead to lose-win, win-win, and win-lose situations for the manufacturer and the retailer. Finally, a prisoner’s dilemma may occur with a low quality investment efficiency, a moderately fixed encroachment cost and a high extent of consumers’ acceptance on the direct channel when a fixed encroachment cost is considered.

scholarly journals Coordination of a Green Supply Chain with One Manufacturer and Two Competing Retailers under Different Power Structures

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Wang ◽  
Xiujuan Liu ◽  
Wensi Zhang ◽  
Ge Gao ◽  
Hui Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Relationship ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Operational Decisions ◽  
Conduct Sensitivity Analysis ◽  
The Impact

The main objective of this research is to examine the role of power relationship in a two-level green supply chain which is made up of one shared manufacturer and two competitive retailers. We develop six game theory-based models to explore the members’ operational decisions in a supply chain taking into account three vertical power structures (Manufacturer Stackelberg, Retailer Stackelberg, and Vertical Nash) as well as two retailers’ horizontal power structure (Bertrand or Stackelberg competition). Then, we design a two-part tariff contract which can encourage the supply chain members to promote cooperation and eventually coordinate the decentralized green supply chain under each power structure. Lastly, to further discuss the impact of the green awareness of consumers and the greening cost on supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits, we employ some numerical examples to conduct sensitivity analysis. The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the impact of power structure on the supply chain players’ operational decisions and profits mainly depends on the substitutability of the green products, the green awareness of consumers, and the greening cost for the manufacturer. Secondly, the more power the manufacturer has, the lower product greenness will be set. Thirdly, the consumer’s environmental awareness (the greening cost) positively (negatively) influences the manufacturer’s product greenness and wholesale price, the retailers’ sales prices, and the player’s profits under each power structure. Finally, the developed two-part tariff contract is practicable and beneficial for both the manufacturer and the two retailers.

The philosophical interpretation of language game theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Zangwill
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Linguistic Meaning ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Philosophical Interpretation ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Abstract I give an informal presentation of the evolutionary game theoretic approach to the conventions that constitute linguistic meaning. The aim is to give a philosophical interpretation of the project, which accounts for the role of game theoretic mathematics in explaining linguistic phenomena. I articulate the main virtue of this sort of account, which is its psychological economy, and I point to the casual mechanisms that are the ground of the application of evolutionary game theory to linguistic phenomena. Lastly, I consider the objection that the account cannot explain predication, logic, and compositionality.

Learning About the Effects of Alert Uncertainty in Attack and Defend Decisions via Cognitive Modeling

2020 ◽  
pp. 001872082094542
Author(s):  
Palvi Aggarwal ◽  
Frederic Moisan ◽  
Cleotilde Gonzalez ◽  
Varun Dutt
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Modeling ◽  
Training Dataset ◽  
Theoretic Approach ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Test Dataset ◽  
Detection Systems ◽  
Instance Based Learning ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Approach

Objective We aim to learn about the cognitive mechanisms governing the decisions of attackers and defenders in cybersecurity involving intrusion detection systems (IDSs). Background Prior research has experimentally studied the role of the presence and accuracy of IDS alerts on attacker’s and defender’s decisions using a game-theoretic approach. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that govern these decisions. Method To investigate the cognitive mechanisms governing the attacker’s and defender’s decisions in the presence of IDSs of different accuracies, instance-based learning (IBL) models were developed. One model (NIDS) disregarded the IDS alerts and one model (IDS) considered them in the instance structure. Both the IDS and NIDS models were trained in an existing dataset where IDSs were either absent or present and they possessed different accuracies. The calibrated IDS model was tested in a newly collected test dataset where IDSs were present 50% of the time and they possessed different accuracies. Results Both the IDS and NIDS models were able to account for human decisions in the training dataset, where IDS was absent or present and it possessed different accuracies. However, the IDS model could accurately predict the decision-making in only one of the several IDS accuracy conditions in the test dataset. Conclusions Cognitive models like IBL may provide some insights regarding the cognitive mechanisms governing the decisions of attackers and defenders in conditions not involving IDSs or IDSs of different accuracies. Application IBL models may be helpful for penetration testing exercises in scenarios involving IDSs of different accuracies.

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