Research on Public Rental Housing PPP Project Launching Dilemmas with Dynamic Evolutionary Game

The public housing PPP projects have encountered a cold reception from the government, which constrained solving the urban housing problem. This paper builds a dynamic game model under incomplete contract conditions, analyzes the key factors affecting the signing of PPP contracts by dynamic evolutionary game analysis, and verifies these factors by simulation. The results show that fiscal spending smoothing, risk transfer, and government performance can promote government to adopt cooperation strategy. Expected project benefits and government performance incentives can promote private capital to adopt cooperation strategy. Changes in transaction cost have a significant impact on the decision of cooperation strategy.

Manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a popular and important strategy for corporate operation and sustainable development. Meanwhile, many social or environmental incidents that occur in one enterprise could bring huge risk or disruption for the entire supply chain. This study discusses the manufacturer’s cooperation strategy of closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a dominant manufacturer with CSR behavior consciousness, a retailer with CSR investment, and a third-party recycler. In the CSR-CLSC, the manufacturer exhibits CSR behavior consciousness through considering stakeholders welfare, the retailer makes CSR investment through profit donation and the third-party recycler exhibits CSR activity through product recycling. And under the Stackelberg Game setting, we formulate four different decision-making models to investigate the interaction between manufacturer’s CSR behavior consciousness and retailer’s CSR investment, as well as their impact on the manufacturer’s cooperative strategy selection and CLSC operation. The results show that both the CSR behavior consciousness of manufacturer and CSR investment of retailer are conducive to reducing the wholesale price of new products, enhancing the recycling rate of waste products and improving the performance of CSR-CLSC members, and both of them have the function of mutual incentives. The vertical cooperation strategy of manufacturer is conducive to increasing the overall performance of CSR-CLSC, and compared with the cooperation with the third-party recycler, the manufacturer has stronger motivation to cooperate with the retailer, and it is also more beneficial to improving the CSR investment level, the waste product recycling rate, and the performance of CSR-CLSC members.

The Prospect Analysis of Sino-US Manufacturing Trade Friction Based on the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

The Sino-US trade friction since 2018 is an important turning point in trade relations between these two countries. As the world's two major manufacturing powers, the friction will have a profound impact on the world. This articlesorts out the comparison of economic and trade strength between these two countries in the past ten years, the dependence of import and export, and the changes in trade structure. Then we construct a dynamic evolutionary model of the strategic choices of these two countries in trade friction from the perspective of evolutionary game. Finally, we analyze the stability of the equilibrium point of the evolutionary game by copying the dynamic equation. The results show that when at least one of these two countries has a cooperative benefit less than the speculative benefits brought about by competition, (competition,competition) is the only evolutionary stable strategy combination, andboth of them will adopt competitive measures. The prerequisite for the combination of (cooperation, cooperation) strategies adopted by these two countries are that the net benefits obtained by the two countries' cooperation strategies are greater than the speculative benefits obtained when one side chooses to cooperate and the other side adopts competitive strategy. The probability that two countries choose cooperation strategy is directly proportional to benefits brought about by cooperation and inversely proportional to the cost of cooperation, the loss of sticking to the cooperation strategy, and the speculative benefits of abandoning cooperation. The trade policies of these two countries cannot be achieved overnight, but can gradually tend to be stable and balanced through mutual imitation and learning.

Empowerment Strategy Masyarakat Desa Wisata Kebonagung Kecamatan Imogiri Kabupaten Bantul Yogyakarta

Research related to community empowerment strategy is taking a case study in Kebonagung tourist village, Imogiri, Bantul Yogyakarta. The purpose of this research is to find the right form of empowerment strategy that aligned with the community. Qualitative research models through the instrument of observation, interviews, and documentation to collect data and facts that occurred in the community based on primary data and secondary data through the data triangulation process. Interviews were conducted by researchers with determining the key person as resources that is the administrator of tourist village and the community. The strategies proposed in this research include cooperation strategy, cultural defection strategy, and conflict strategy through objective structural approaches as well as objective non-structural approaches. The results showed that community involvement in the existence of tourist village from various economic and socio-cultural aspects have a positive impact even though not yet fully. The openness of employment and business opportunity occurred very positively on the participation of the community in the provision of accommodation facilities, but in the social and cultural aspects has not been maximized. Empowerment strategy recommended through this research in order to reach the economic and socio-cultural aspects of the maximum is more priority to the strategy of cooperation in accordance with the culture of rural communities