scholarly journals An extension of Majority Judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
José Luis GARCÍA-LAPRESTA ◽  
Ricardo Alberto MARQUES PEREIRA
Keyword(s):  
Majority Judgment

Applying Majority Judgment over a Polyhedral Candidate Space

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiwei Yan ◽  
Prem Swaroop ◽  
Michael O. Ball ◽  
Cynthia Barnhart ◽  
Vikrant Vaze
Keyword(s):  
Majority Judgment

The Arbitral Award in the Enrica Lexie Case and its Questionable Recognition of Functional Immunity to the Italian Marines Under Customary International Law

2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 209-225
Author(s):  
Raffaella Nigro
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Current Practice ◽  
The State ◽  
Arbitral Tribunal ◽  
Customary International Law ◽  
Criminal Jurisdiction ◽  
State Practice ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Functional Immunity ◽  
The Military

The dispute between Italy and India on the Enrica Lexie incident has finally been decided by the Award handed down on 21 May 2020 by the Arbitral Tribunal to which the Parties had referred the case. After having concluded that it had jurisdiction on the issue of the immunity of the two Italian marines involved in the case at hand, the majority judgment (by three votes to two) affirmed that under customary international law the latter enjoyed functional immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of India. This article will argue that the Arbitral Tribunal’s conclusions are unconvincing, first and foremost, considering that, based on State practice, it is not possible to affirm without reservations that a settled customary rule exists under international law conferring immunity to all State officials, and regardless of the type of functions they perform. In fact, immunity has often been recognized as applying only to certain categories of State officials, and on the basis of the governmental nature of the functions they perform on behalf of the State. Given the doubtful existence under customary international law of a clear rule establishing the functional immunity of all State officials, for all the acts performed in the exercise of their functions, this article argues that the Arbitral Tribunal should have firstly ascertained the existence of a specific customary rule on the immunity of the military abroad, together with the exact content of such rule and, secondly, whether this was applicable in the case of the Enrica Lexie. As current practice stands, military forces abroad are entitled to immunity only under specific circumstances, which do not seem to occur in the present case. In particular, this article maintains that the Italian marines were not entitled to functional immunity. While the acts they performed did indeed fall within their typical functions, they were exercised on behalf of a private subject and not on behalf of the Italian State.

Multicriteria Ranking

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Common Language ◽  
Multicriteria Evaluation ◽  
Multicriteria Problems ◽  
Majority Judgment

In this chapter, the majority judgment is extended to multicriteria problems. The most reasonable application of the majority judgment to multicriteria evaluation can be achieved by using a common language. The use of a particular procedure for multicriteria inputs will depend on the particular application. The chapter also describes several types of multicriteria majority judgments, including the judge-based majority judgment in which majority-grades of the sum of the points are calculated, and the criterion-based majority judgment in which first majority-grade of each criterion’s grades are calculated. It furthermore defines judge-based and criterion-based majority judgment procedures, which include a judge-based procedure and criterion-based procedure.

The Game of Voting

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Condorcet Winner ◽  
Election Outcome ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Grade Distribution ◽  
Best Response ◽  
Strong Equilibria ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Best Response Correspondence

This chapter compares majority judgment mechanism to other methods, including first-past-the-post and Borda’s method, among others, in the context of the game of voting. The concept of utilities, which depends on grade distribution of the electorate, is extended to election output. When the identity of the election winner is dependent on the utilities of voters, Condorcet-winner is elected by a large number of strong-equilibria strategy-profiles. The chapter explores best-response correspondence, according to which, if the number of possible equilibria is very small and sometimes unique, the Condorcet-winner emerges as the unique, possible equilibrium outcome and honest votes determine the election outcome.

Majority Judgment

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Theory And Practice ◽  
Traditional Theory ◽  
New Paradigm ◽  
National Elections ◽  
Acceptable Solution ◽  
Strategic Manipulation ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Collective Ranking ◽  
The Many ◽  
Traditional Paradigm

This book argues that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. It finds that the traditional model—transforming the “preference lists” of individuals into a “preference list” of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. The authors propose a different model, which leads to a new theory and method: majority judgment. Majority judgment is meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet’s paradox and Arrow’s paradox. The authors offer theoretical, practical and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on wine, sports, music, and other competitions, they argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm: to evaluate.

scholarly journals What has Dunsmuir Taught?

2010 ◽  
pp. 1017
Author(s):  
Alice Woolley ◽  
Shaun Fluker
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Review Process ◽  
Functional Test ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Review Analysis ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Majority Judgment ◽  
Administrative Tribunal

In Dunsmuir the Supreme Court of Canada reassessed the “troubling question” of how courts should review decisions of administrative tribunals. The majority judgment of Bastarache and LeBel JJ. (writing also for McLachlin, Abella, and Fish JJ.), sought to simplify the judicial review process by reducing the standards of review from three to two, increasing reliance on precedent to determine which standard is appropriate, making explicit the significance of the nature of the question to the determination of the standard in every case, and re-labelling the “pragmatic and functional” test the “standard of review analysis.” In its recent judgment in Khosa the Supreme Court emphasized the simplifying intention of Dunsmuir, suggesting that “Dunsmuir teaches that judicial review should be less concerned with the formulation of different standards of review and more focused on substance, particularly on the nature of the issue that was before the administrative tribunal under review.”

Objections to Majority Judgment

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Practical Method ◽  
Majority Judgment

This chapter focuses on majority judgment drawbacks. Properties, including participant-consistency, join-consistency, and proper cancellation, which majority judgment does not satisfy, are also lacking in other traditional models of social choice theory. The chapter concludes that majority judgment is a practical method for ranking and electing, and is a choice-monotonic, rank-monotonic, and strongly monotonic method. Drawbacks of traditional models are also highlighted, and it is stated that the traditional models lack guarantees of change in the estimation of voters without affecting the outcome of the election or ranking. The chapter discusses the critics of the majority judgment, who do not take into consideration the strategic behavior of judges and voters.

Common Language: Voting

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Balinski ◽  
Rida Laraki
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Common Language ◽  
Cultural Meanings ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
French Presidential Elections ◽  
Rank Orders ◽  
Majority Judgment

This chapter focuses on the importance of a simplified common language with clear cultural meanings for grading political candidates. Voters using majority judgment are better at expressing their opinion about a candidate compared with giving rank-orders. The 2007 Orsay experiment in the context of the majority judgment ballot that took place during the French presidential elections in 2007 is also discussed, with a focus on the use of language in which the hypothetical voting process was explained to voters. Analysis on the grades allotted during the experiment is presented along with homogeneity of voters’ grades to consider the use of language by the voting population.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document