This book argues that the traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, judge, or rank. It finds that the traditional model—transforming the “preference lists” of individuals into a “preference list” of society—is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. The authors propose a different model, which leads to a new theory and method: majority judgment. Majority judgment is meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet’s paradox and Arrow’s paradox. The authors offer theoretical, practical and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support their arguments. Drawing on wine, sports, music, and other competitions, they argue that the question should not be how to transform many individual rankings into a single collective ranking but rather, after defining a common language of grades to measure merit, how to transform the many individual evaluations of each competitor into a single collective evaluation of all competitors. The crux of the matter is a new model in which the traditional paradigm—to compare—is replaced by a new paradigm: to evaluate.