A new converged Emperor Penguin Optimizer for biding strategy in a day-ahead deregulated market clearing price: A case study in China

Energy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 227 ◽  
pp. 120386
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Lu ◽  
Yang Yang ◽  
Peifang Wang ◽  
Yiming Fan ◽  
Fangzhong Yu ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Emperor Penguin ◽  
Market Clearing ◽  
Market Clearing Price

scholarly journals Market Clearing Price Calculation for a Deregulated Power Market

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (42) ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Kalyanasundaram ◽  
K. Vijayakumar ◽  
Pradeep Vishnuram ◽  
P. Kanakaraj
Keyword(s):  
Power Market ◽  
Market Clearing ◽  
Market Clearing Price

scholarly journals A Two-Sided Price-Decoupled Pay-As-Bid Auction Approach for the Clearing of Day-Ahead Electricity Markets

2020 ◽  
Vol 162 ◽  
pp. 01006
Author(s):  
Dávid Csercsik
Keyword(s):  
Objective Function ◽  
Electricity Markets ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Conventional Approach ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
Power Balance ◽  
Market Clearing ◽  
Multiunit Auctions ◽  
Market Clearing Price ◽  
Characteristic Features

In this paper we propose a possible alternative for conventional pay-as-clear type multiunit auctions commonly used for the clearing of day-ahead power exchanges, and analyse some of its characteristic features in comparison with conventional clearing. In the proposed framework, instead of the concept of the uniform market clearing price, we introduce limit prices separately for supply and demand bids, and in addition to the power balance constraint, we formulate constraints for the income balance of the market. The total traded quantity is used as the objective function of the formulation. The concept is demonstrated on a simple example and is compared to the conventional approach in small-scale market simulations.

Property Rights over Marital Transfers *

2015 ◽  
Vol 130 (3) ◽  
pp. 1421-1484 ◽  
Author(s):  
Siwan Anderson ◽  
Chris Bidner
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Human Capital ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Women's Rights ◽  
Marriage Market ◽  
Women’S Rights ◽  
Market Clearing ◽  
Market Clearing Price ◽  
Shed Light

Abstract In developing countries, the extent to which women possess property rights is shaped in large part by transfers received at the time of marriage. Focusing on dowry, we develop a simple model of the marriage market with intrahousehold bargaining to understand the incentives for brides’ parents to allocate the rights over the dowry between their daughter and her groom. In doing so, we clarify and formalize the “dual role” of dowry—as a premortem bequest and as a market clearing price—identified in the literature. We use the model to shed light on the intriguing observation that in contrast to other rights, women’s rights over the dowry tend to deteriorate with development. We show how marriage payments are utilized even when they are inefficient, and how the marriage market mitigates changes in other dimensions of women’s rights even to the point where women are worse off following a strengthening of such rights. We also generate predictions for when marital transfers will disappear and highlight the importance of female human capital for the welfare of women.

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