Incentives, green preferences, and private provision of impure public goods

2016 ◽  
Vol 79 ◽  
pp. 208-220 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey J. Wichman
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods ◽  
Green Preferences

scholarly journals The Private Provision of International Impure Public Goods: The Case of Climate Policy

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Altemeyer-Bartscher ◽  
Anil Markandya ◽  
Dirk T. G. Rübbelke
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Climate Policy ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods

THE EFFECTS OF UNCERTAINTY ON THE VOLUNTARY PRIVATE PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
ILTAE KIM
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Collective Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods ◽  
Impure Public Good ◽  
Increase In Risk

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty on an individual's own contribution to the provision of the collective good using an impure public good model. Two types of uncertainty analyzing free-riding behavior are evaluated: (i) uncertainty surrounding the contributions of others to the public characteristic and (ii) uncertainty surrounding the response of others to an individual's own contribution. We extend previous studies by examining both the compensated and uncompensated effects of increases in such risks on the provision of the collective good. We also establish the conditions that are sufficient to determine both compensated and the total, uncompensated effects of an increase in risk on the voluntary provision of the collective good.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Hide-Fumi Yokoo
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Inequality Aversion ◽  
Public Good Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
Marginal Rate Of Substitution ◽  
Good Provision ◽  
Corner Solutions

AbstractI develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods

1995 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Buchholz ◽  
Kai A. Konrad
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision

A Case for Private Provision but Collective Ownership of Public Goods

1998 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-94 ◽  
Author(s):  
William D. Gerdes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Private Provision ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Ownership ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Voluntary Exchange

One strategy for generating Pareto results in a public good model is to create an environment where traders internalize the public good externality. The model presented here accomplishes this by separating the provision and ownership of public goods. Such goods are privately provided but collectively owned. Under this arrangement, Lindahl prices are generated through the voluntary exchange activities of consumers. Persistent attempts to free ride are not consistent with maximizing behavior which leads to internalization.

On the Private Provision of Intertemporal Public Goods with Stock Effects

2012 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-255 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anke Gerber ◽  
Philipp C. Wichardt
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Provision
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