Slugging: Casual Carpooling for Urban Transit

Problem definition: “Slugging,” or casual carpooling, refers to the commuting practice of drivers picking up passengers at designated locations and offering them a free ride in order to qualify for high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. Academic/practical relevance: It is estimated that tens of thousands of daily commuters rely on slugging to go to work in major U.S. cities. As drivers save commute time and passengers ride for free, slugging can be a promising Smart Mobility solution. However, little is known about the welfare, policy, and environmental implications of slugging. Methodology: We develop a stylized model that captures the essence of slugging. We characterize commuters’ equilibrium behavior in the model. Results: We find that slugging indeed makes commuters better off. However, the widely observed free-ride tradition is socially suboptimal. As compared with the social optimum, commuters always underslug in the free-slugging equilibrium when highway travel time is insensitive to slugging activities but may overslug otherwise. The socially optimal outcome can be achieved by allowing pecuniary exchanges between drivers and passengers. Interestingly, passengers may be better off if they pay for a ride than if they do not under free slugging. We also find that although policy initiatives to expand highway capacity or improve public transportation always increase social welfare in the absence of slugging, they may reduce social welfare in areas where free slugging is a major commuting choice. Nevertheless, these unintended consequences would be mitigated by the introduction of pecuniary exchanges. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, slugging as a form of carpooling can result in more cars on the road and thus, more carbon emissions. Managerial implications: Our results call upon the slugging community to rethink the free-ride practice. We also caution that slugging benefits commuters possibly to the detriment of the environment.

Dynamic game analysis on pricing and service strategy in a retailer-led supply chain with risk attitudes and free-ride effect

PurposeThe convenience of online shopping enables the manufacturer to develop direct channels. To counter manufacturer encroachment, the retailer tends to provide presale service to attract more customers. Meanwhile, the service provided by the retailer also has a positive impact on the manufacturer's sale volume, which is usually called the showrooming effect or free-ride. The purpose of this paper is to explore the dynamic game of pricing and service strategy in a dual-channel supply chain with risk attitudes and free-ride.Design/methodology/approachThis paper considers the risk attitude, characterized by mean-variance theory. First, the optimal pricing and service strategy of two static models under two scenarios are derived. Second, dynamic games are then considered to explore the evolution of the decisions. The classical optimization method is used to solve the problem, and numerical experiments are done to analyze the complex characteristic of the system.FindingsThe result shows that the retailer is willing to provide a higher level of service if his risk preference is higher. The offline retail price and online retail price are positively related to the retailer's risk preference. Besides, the free-ride behavior can reduce the offline retail price and the level of service provided by the retailer. Furthermore, the study indicates that the system is more likely to enter chaos if the retailer's risk preference is higher. Additionally, consumers' service sensitivity and cost coefficient affect the stability of the system.Originality/valueThe study provides a different perspective on supply chain management considering risk attitudes and free-ride The findings of the study can offer theoretical and practical guidance for enterprises to choose adjustment measures according to their risk preference.

Implementation Problems and Improvement Strategies of Free Ride Policy for the Elderly

<p>Shanghai has abolished the policy of free travel for the elderly and changed it into a comprehensive allowance for the elderly. This paper analyzes the problems existing in the free ride policy for the elderly from the perspective of citizens, enterprises and the government, and then puts forward three feasible improvement strategies: one is free for limited time, the other is free for limited times, and the third is to change the unlimited implicit subsidy to the quota explicit subsidy, which has reference significance for improving the free ride system for the elderly.</p>