A Kuhn–Tucker model for behaviour in dictator games

We consider a dictator game experiment in which dictators perform a sequence of giving tasks and taking tasks. The data are used to estimate the parameters of a Stone–Geary utility function over own-payoff and other’s payoff. The econometric model incorporates zero observations (e.g. zero-giving or zero-taking) by applying the Kuhn–Tucker theorem and treating zeros as corner solutions in the dictator’s constrained optimisation problem. The method of maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) is used for estimation. We find that selfishness is significantly lower in taking tasks than in giving tasks, and we attribute this difference to the “cold prickle of taking”.

A Model of Inequality Aversion and Private Provision of Public Goods

I develop a model of inequality aversion and public goods that allows the marginal rate of substitution to be variable. As a theoretical foundation, utility function of the standard public goods model is nested in the Fehr-Schmidt model. An individual’s contribution function for a public good is derived by solving the problem of kinky preference and examining both interior and corner solutions. Results show that the derived contribution function is not monotonic with respect to the other individual’s provision. Thus, the model can be used to explain empirical evidence for the effect of social comparison on public-good provision.

Identification and Estimation of Intensive Margin Effects by Difference-in-Difference Methods

This paper discusses identification and estimation of causal intensive margin effects. The causal intensive margin effect is defined as the treatment effect on the outcome of individuals with a positive outcome irrespective of whether they are treated or not, and is of interest for outcomes with corner solutions. The main issue is to deal with a potential selection problem that arises when conditioning on positive outcomes. We propose using difference-in-difference methods - conditional on positive outcomes - to estimate causal intensive margin effects. We derive sufficient conditions under which the difference-in-difference estimator identifies the causal intensive margin effect. We apply the methodology to estimate the causal intensive margin effect of reaching the full retirement age on working hours.

Estimation methods in the presence of corner solutions

In this article, I introduce a new command, nehurdle, that collects maximum likelihood estimators for linear, exponential, homoskedastic, and heteroskedastic tobit; truncated hurdle; and type II tobit models that involve explained variables with corner solutions. I review what a corner solution is as well as the assumptions of the mentioned models.

Proactivity and Retroactivity of Firms and Information Sharing of Hackers

One firm defends proactively or retroactively against a first hacker, and thereafter against a second hacker, in four four-period games. The hackers share information for financial gain, mutual advantage, and reputation. The first hacker’s attack and information sharing are strategic substitutes. When the firm is proactive in period 1, the first hacker’s information sharing decreases as the second hacker’s attack cost increases. The deterring effort in eight corner solutions is proportional to the deterred player’s valuation and inverse proportional to the deterred player’s unit effort cost. When the first hacker exerts higher effort and shares more information, lower defense by the firm is sufficient to deter the second hacker. When the firm is deterred by the first hacker, the first hacker attacks less and shares more information than in the interior solution. For the first hacker and the firm, both players commonly prefer the disadvantaged player to move first. The exception is that the firm prefers to deter the first disadvantaged hacker when the two hackers benefit substantially from information sharing, reputation gain, or the second player is advantaged. The results contrast with the literature where the advantaged player commonly prefers to move first, with conflicting sequence preferences.