Correlation-robust auction design

The author considers the ways in which the rights of user of the forestry in Russia are granted. The article analyzes the international experience of forest auctions and describes the main problems of the auction design.

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Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3700525 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Saeed Alaei ◽

Alexandre Belloni ◽

Ali Makhdoumi ◽

Azarakhsh Malekian

Keyword(s):

Auction Design ◽

Optimal Auction

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Auction Design for ROI-Constrained Buyers

Proceedings of the Web Conference 2021 ◽

10.1145/3442381.3449841 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Negin Golrezaei ◽

Ilan Lobel ◽

Renato Paes Leme

Keyword(s):

Auction Design

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Inference and auction design in online advertising

Communications of the ACM ◽

10.1145/3035966 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 60 (7) ◽

pp. 70-79 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Denis Nekipelov ◽

Tammy Wang

Keyword(s):

Online Advertising ◽

Auction Design

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Incentive Auction Design Alternatives: A Simulation Study

Proceedings of the 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation ◽

10.1145/3391403.3399499 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Neil Newman ◽

Kevin Leyton-Brown ◽

Paul Milgrom ◽

Ilya Segal

Keyword(s):

Simulation Study ◽

Auction Design ◽

Design Alternatives

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Combinatorial Auction Design

Management Science ◽

10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1485.20585 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 49 (11) ◽

pp. 1485-1503 ◽

Cited By ~ 150

Author(s):

Aleksandar Pekeč ◽

Michael H. Rothkopf

Keyword(s):

Combinatorial Auction ◽

Auction Design

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Is the local wheat market a ‘market for lemons’? Certifying the supply of individual wheat farmers in Ethiopia

European Review of Agricultural Economics ◽

10.1093/erae/jbab018 ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Banawe Plambou Anissa ◽

Gashaw Abate ◽

Tanguy Bernard ◽

Erwin Bulte

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Information ◽

Willingness To Pay ◽

Wheat Quality ◽

High Quality ◽

Auction Design ◽

Market For Lemons ◽

Wheat Market ◽

Ex Ante

Abstract Bulking and mixing of smallholder supply dilutes incentives to supply high quality. We introduce wheat ‘grading and certification shops’ in Ethiopia and use an auction design to gauge willingness-to-pay (WTP) for certification. Bids correlate positively with wheat quality, and ex ante notification of the opportunity of certification improves wheat quality. These findings suggest that local wheat markets resemble a ‘market for lemons’, crippled by asymmetric information. However, aggregate WTP for grading and certification services does not re-coup the sum of fixed, flow and variable costs associated with running a single certification shop.

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