spectrum auction
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Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Johannes K. Chiang ◽  
Chien-Liang Lin ◽  
Yi-Fang Chiang ◽  
Yushun Su

Fifth generation (5G) mobile networks can accomplish enhanced communication capabilities and desired to connect things in addition to people. By means of optimally splitting the spectrum to integrate more efficient segments, mobile operators can deliver better Quality of Services (QoS) for Internet of Things (IoT), even the nowadays so-called metaverse need broadband mobile communication. Drawing on the Theory of Quality Value Transformation, we developed a 5G ecosystem as a sustainable organic coalition constituted of planners, providers, and users. Most importantly, we put forward the altruism as the ethics drive for the organic cooperative evolution to sustain the inclusive sharing economy to solve the problem of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. On the top of the collaboration framework for the coalition game for 5G, we adopted Pareto Optimality as the target situation for the optimization via cooperative evolution and further apply ISO 25000 to define the metrics for the value of 5G corresponding to Pareto Frontier. Based on the collaboration framework as above, we conducted a survey to gather the features and costs for the 5G spectrum in relation to IoT and the financial status of the mobile operators as the constraint for the optimization. Taking Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) as the standard rule for spectrum auction, we developed a novel optimization program of two hybrid metaheuristics with the combination of Simulated Annealing (SA), Genetic Algorithm (GA), and Random Optimization (RO) for the multiple objectives of quality, usability, and costs. The results of the simulation show that the coalition game for 5G spectrum auction is a dynamic group decision in which the government authority and mobile operators can achieve a synergy to maximize the profits, quality score, and usability, and minimize the costs. Last but not least, the hybrid metaheuristic with SA and RO is more efficient and effective than that with GA and BO, from the perspective of inclusive sharing economy. It is the first study of its kind as we know.


2021 ◽  
pp. 100037
Author(s):  
Ruinian Li ◽  
Tianyi Song ◽  
Bo Mei ◽  
Chunqiang Hu ◽  
Wei Li ◽  
...  

Significance This came after the government announced plans for a 4G spectrum auction in March 2021, after a five-year gap. There is growing speculation that this will be followed by an auction of 5G spectrum later in the year. Impacts Reliance’s lead on 5G will boost its broader digital business strategy. New financial support to indebted telcos will help to avoid further strain on public sector banks. Data tariffs are likely to remain competitive in India, even after a new floor price.


2021 ◽  
pp. 142-153
Author(s):  
Zhuoming Zhu ◽  
Shengling Wang ◽  
Rongfang Bie ◽  
Xiuzhen Cheng

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Mingwu Zhang ◽  
Bingruolan Zhou

Combinatorial auctions can be employed in the fields such as spectrum auction, network routing, railroad segment, and energy auction, which allow multiple goods to be sold simultaneously and any combination of goods to be bid and the maximum sum of combinations of bidding prices to be calculated. However, in traditional combinatorial auction mechanisms, data concerning bidders’ price and bundle might reveal sensitive information, such as personal preference and competitive relation since the winner determination problem needs to be resolved in terms of sensitive data as above. In order to solve this issue, this paper exploits a privacy-preserving and verifiable combinatorial auction protocol (PP-VCA) to protect bidders’ privacy and ensure the correct auction price in a secure manner, in which we design a one-way and monotonically increasing function to protect a bidder’s bid to enable the auctioneer to pick out the largest bid without revealing any information about bids. Moreover, we design and employ three subprotocols, namely, privacy-preserving winner determination protocol, privacy-preserving scalar protocol, and privacy-preserving verifiable payment determination protocol, to implement the combinatorial auction with bidder privacy and payment verifiability. The results of comprehensive experimental evaluations indicate that our proposed scheme provides a better efficiency and flexibility to meet different types of data volume in terms of the number of goods and bidders.


Author(s):  
Jiaqi Wang ◽  
Ning Lu ◽  
Qingfeng Cheng ◽  
Lu Zhou ◽  
Wenbo Shi

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