Conflicts of interest, information provision, and competition in the financial services industry

Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech entitled “The Few” after the Battle of Britain of 1940. This historical conflict saw 2353 young men from Great Britain and 574 from overseas, pilots and other aircrew fly at least one authorized operational sortie with an eligible unit of the Royal Air Force or Fleet Air Arm during the period 10 July to 31 October 1940. Although conflict on the scale of a world war cannot be equated to conflicts of interest between financial-services providers (FSPs), representatives and clients, the potential damage that can be caused by intermediaries and representatives who act in their own interest can be devastating to that particular client. In addition, it also has wider implications for the financial-services industry. It is consequently up to the FinancialServices Board (FSB) to ensure that conflict of interest between intermediaries and representatives and clients are managed in anacceptable way. As a matter of background: The FSB was established by the Financial Services Board Act (97 of 1990) and has as its main objective the supervision of financial institutions in order to achieve maximum consumer protection. As such, the FSB acts as statutory registrar of a variety of financial institutions. Hattingh and Millard explain that the FSB is currently in control of the Collective Investment Schemes Control Act, the Financial Services Board Act, Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act , Financial Supervision of the Road Accident Fund Act, Friendly Societies Act, Inspection of Financial Institutions Act, Long-term Insurance Act, Pension Funds Act, Short-term Insurance Act, Supervision of the Financial Institutions Rationalisation Act, the Securities Services Act, and the Financial Advisory and Intermediaries Act. The FSB drafted the FAIS Act with the aim of creating a regulatory structure which regulates the way in which intermediary and advisory services in respect of financial products are rendered. Conflict of interests is but one of the issues that arise between intermediaries, advisors, financial-services providers and clients and the purpose of this note is to analyse a number of key issues introduced by Board Notice 58 of 19 April 2010. This note sets out to explain what the position was before the introduction of the new rules on the management of conflict of interest. It then proceeds to discuss the new definitions that now form part of the legislation. In addition, it discusses the detailed provisions pertaining to conflict of interest and explains what a conflict-of-interest management policy entails. Finally, the note evaluates the new regulations and asks whether they have thepotential to eliminate unfair dealings by advisors and intermediaries and thereby enhancing the professionalism of those who work in the financial-services industry.

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“Best interest” of whom?

Journal of Investment Compliance ◽

10.1108/joic-08-2015-0051 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 17 (1) ◽

pp. 83-100

Author(s):

Jeffery E. Schaff ◽

Michele L. Schaff

Keyword(s):

Conflict Of Interest ◽

Financial Services ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Standards Of Care ◽

Financial Services Industry ◽

Valuable Insight ◽

Best Interest ◽

Content Type ◽

Services Industry ◽

High Standards

Purpose Explains the US Department of Labor’s newly proposed “Conflicts of Interest” rule and provides a critical analysis of its impact should it be adopted as proposed. Design/methodology/approach Explains the DOL’s proposed Conflict of Interest rule and discusses how it changes the current fiduciary standards of care under ERISA. The article then probes more deeply into the practical matters involved in implementing the rule, and into the realities of how it would impact fiduciary standards generally, investors, the financial services industry and securities arbitrations. Reactions to the proposed rule are then explained against the backdrop of the practical implications thereof. Findings This article concludes that the DOL’s proposed Conflict of Interest rule, albeit well-intended, is not reasonably designed to achieve its stated goal and would instead likely harm those whom it purports to help. Ironically, it also potentially waters down the existing high standards of current fiduciaries. The article supports the DOL’s goal of greater responsibility for financial service professionals and proffers an alternative solution that could achieve the desired result more effectively. Originality/value This article offers valuable insight on the realities of the proposed law and practical guidance on its implications to the investing public, the financial services industry and securities attorneys.

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Impacts of Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.2794246 ◽

2015 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Jeremy Burke ◽

Angela Hung ◽

Jack Clift ◽

Steven Garber ◽

Joanne Yoong

Keyword(s):

Financial Services ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Financial Services Industry ◽

Services Industry

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Disclosure effectiveness in the financial planning industry

Qualitative Research in Financial Markets ◽

10.1108/qrfm-04-2020-0060 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽

Author(s):

Daniel W. Richards ◽

Maryam Safari

Keyword(s):

Financial Planning ◽

Financial Services ◽

Conflicts Of Interest ◽

Influential Factors ◽

Future Research ◽

Financial Services Industry ◽

Content Type ◽

Disclosure Requirements ◽

Financial Planners ◽

Services Industry

Purpose Scandals in the Australian financial services industry highlight the conflicts of interest between those who provide financial advice (financial planners) and their clients. Disclosure is a potential governance tool to manage these conflicts of interest by reducing asymmetries in information. Yet, the efficacy of disclosure is questionable as scandals persist, so this paper aims to research the effectiveness of disclosure in financial planning. Design/methodology/approach This research used a qualitative approach involving the triangulation of data from parliamentary inquiries in financial services with data collected in semi-structured interviews with financial planning professionals. Findings The findings draw a clear portrayal of the disclosure requirements and illustrate how disclosure processes are onerous and complex. Starting with detangling the complex interactions between the beneficial role of disclosure in reducing information asymmetry and unethical behaviour and the detrimental effect of information overload, the authors then highlight effective disclosure techniques used by financial planners, including visualisation of material information. The study reveals that financial planners perceive their role as filtering information for clients and ensuring clients’ comprehension, due to the onerous disclosure requirements. Research limitations/implications The study is of interest to researchers, practitioners, policymakers and society as it implies that how disclosure occurs is as important as what information is disclosed. Those who wish to foster effective disclosure in the financial services industry need to consider the quantity, quality and process of disclosure. A limitation is the research focusses on financial planning practices and not client outcomes, which could be considered in future research. Originality/value The study adds to the understanding of how disclosure is used as a governance tool and how the quantity of information may impede the effectiveness of disclosure in the financial planning industry. In addition, the study identifies and elaborates on the influential factors and best practices for enhancing the disclosure effectiveness by financial planners.

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