Graded Epistemic Logic with public announcement

2021 ◽  
pp. 100732
Author(s):  
Mário Benevides ◽  
Alexandre Madeira ◽  
Manuel A. Martins
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Public Announcement

A cut-free labelled sequent calculus for dynamic epistemic logic

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 321-348
Author(s):  
Shoshin Nomura ◽  
Hiroakira Ono ◽  
Katsuhiko Sano
Keyword(s):  
Modal Logic ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Sequent Calculus ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic ◽  
Kripke Semantics ◽  
Cut Rule ◽  
Public Announcement ◽  
Public Announcement Logic ◽  
Soundness And Completeness ◽  
Labelled Sequent Calculus

Abstract Dynamic epistemic logic is a logic that is aimed at formally expressing how a person’s knowledge changes. We provide a cut-free labelled sequent calculus ($\textbf{GDEL}$) on the background of existing studies of Hilbert-style axiomatization $\textbf{HDEL}$ of dynamic epistemic logic and labelled calculi for public announcement logic. We first show that the $cut$ rule is admissible in $\textbf{GDEL}$ and show that $\textbf{GDEL}$ is sound and complete for Kripke semantics. Moreover, we show that the basis of $\textbf{GDEL}$ is extended from modal logic K to other familiar modal logics including S5 with keeping the admissibility of cut, soundness and completeness.

scholarly journals ‘KNOWABLE’ AS ‘KNOWN AFTER AN ANNOUNCEMENT’

2008 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 305-334 ◽  
Author(s):  
PHILIPPE BALBIANI ◽  
ALEXANDRU BALTAG ◽  
HANS VAN DITMARSCH ◽  
ANDREAS HERZIG ◽  
TOMOHIRO HOSHI ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Natural Generalization ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Modal Operator ◽  
Public Announcement ◽  
Public Announcement Logic

Public announcement logic is an extension of multiagent epistemic logic with dynamic operators to model the informational consequences of announcements to the entire group of agents. We propose an extension of public announcement logic with a dynamic modal operator that expresses what is true after any announcement: ⋄φ expresses that there is a truthful announcement ψ after which φ is true. This logic gives a perspective on Fitch's knowability issues: For which formulas φ, does it hold that φ → ⋄Kφ? We give various semantic results and show completeness for a Hilbert-style axiomatization of this logic. There is a natural generalization to a logic for arbitrary events.

An improved QKD protocol without public announcement basis using periodically derived basis

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Qidong Jia ◽  
Kaiping Xue ◽  
Zhonghui Li ◽  
Mengce Zheng ◽  
David S. L. Wei ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Announcement

Introducing Justification into Epistemic Logic

2005 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 1059-1073 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergei Artemov ◽  
Elena Nogina
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic

Does uncertainty boost overconfidence? The case of financial analysts' forecasts

2014 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 300-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
Véronique Bessière ◽  
Taoufik Elkemali
Keyword(s):  
Stock Returns ◽  
Private Information ◽  
High Tech ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Forecast Dispersion ◽  
Content Type ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Announcement ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Sectional Analysis

Purpose – This article aims to examine the link between uncertainty and analysts' reaction to earnings announcements for a sample of European firms during the period 1997-2007. In the same way as Daniel et al., the authors posit that overconfidence leads to an overreaction to private information followed by an underreaction when the information becomes public. Design/methodology/approach – In this study, the authors test analysts' overconfidence through the overreaction preceding a public announcement followed by an underreaction after the announcement. If overconfidence occurs, over- and underreactions should be, respectively, observed before and after the public announcement. If uncertainty boosts overconfidence, the authors predict that these two combined misreactions should be stronger when uncertainty is higher. Uncertainty is defined according to technology intensity, and separate two types of firms: high-tech or low-tech. The authors use a sample of European firms during the period 1997-2007. Findings – The results support the overconfidence hypothesis. The authors jointly observe the two phenomena of under- and overreaction. Overreaction occurs when the information has not yet been made public and disappears just after public release. The results also show that both effects are more important for the high-tech subsample. For robustness, the authors sort the sample using analyst forecast dispersion as a proxy for uncertainty and obtain similar results. The authors also document that the high-tech stocks crash in 2000-2001 moderated the overconfidence of analysts, which then strongly declined during the post-crash period. Originality/value – This study offers interesting insights in two ways. First, in the area of financial markets, it provides a test of a major over- and underreaction model and implements it to analysts' reactions through their revisions (versus investors' reactions through stock returns). Second, in a broader way, it deals with the link between uncertainty and biases. The results are consistent with the experimental evidence and extend it to a cross-sectional analysis that reinforces it as pointed out by Kumar.

INTERPERSONAL COORDINATION AND EPISTEMIC SUPPORT FOR INTENTIONS WITH WE-CONTENT

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 345-367 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olivier Roy
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
The Other ◽  
Interpersonal Coordination ◽  
Epistemic Game Theory ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Alternative Set

In this paper I study intentions of the form ‘I intend that we . . .’, that is, intentions with a we-content, and their role in interpersonal coordination. I focus on the notion of epistemic support for such intentions. Using tools from epistemic game theory and epistemic logic, I cast doubt on whether such support guarantees the other agents' conditional mediation in the achievement of such intentions, something that appears important if intentions with a we-content are to count as genuine intentions. I then formulate a stronger version of epistemic support, one that does indeed ensure the required mediation, but I then argue that it rests on excessively strong informational conditions. In view of this I provide an alternative set of conditions that are jointly sufficient for coordination in games, and I argue that these conditions constitute a plausible alternative to the proposed notion of epistemic support.

Topo-Logic as a Dynamic-Epistemic Logic

2017 ◽  
pp. 330-346 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandru Baltag ◽  
Aybüke Özgün ◽  
Ana Lucia Vargas Sandoval
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Logic ◽  
Dynamic Epistemic Logic
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