scholarly journals Optimal strategies for adaptive zero-sum average Markov games

2013 ◽  
Vol 402 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adolfo Minjárez-Sosa ◽  
Óscar Vega-Amaya
2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 826-849 ◽  
Author(s):  
Prasenjit Mondal

Abstract Zero-sum two-person finite undiscounted (limiting ratio average) semi-Markov games (SMGs) are considered with a general multichain structure. We derive the strategy evaluation equations for stationary strategies of the players. A relation between the payoff in the multichain SMG and that in the associated stochastic game (SG) obtained by a data-transformation is established. We prove that the multichain optimality equations (OEs) for an SMG have a solution if and only if the associated SG has optimal stationary strategies. Though the solution of the OEs may not be optimal for an SMG, we establish the significance of studying the OEs for a multichain SMG. We provide a nice example of SMGs in which one player has no optimal strategy in the stationary class but has an optimal semistationary strategy (that depends only on the initial and current state of the game). For an SMG with absorbing states, we prove that solutions in the game where all players are restricted to semistationary strategies are solutions for the unrestricted game. Finally, we prove the existence of stationary optimal strategies for unichain SMGs and conclude that the unichain condition is equivalent to require that the game satisfies some recurrence/ergodicity/weakly communicating conditions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 105-119
Author(s):  
Fernando Luque-Vásquez ◽  
◽  
J. Adolfo Minjárez-Sosa ◽  

2009 ◽  
Vol 48 (3) ◽  
pp. 1405-1421 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Adolfo Minjárez-Sosa ◽  
Oscar Vega-Amaya

1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (01) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arbind K. Lal ◽  
Sagnik Sinha

Semi-Markov games are investigated under discounted and limiting average payoff criteria. The issue of the existence of the value and a pair of stationary optimal strategies are settled; the optimality equation is studied and under a natural ergodic condition the existence of a solution to the optimality equation is proved for the limiting average case. Semi-Markov games provide useful flexibility in constructing recursive game models. All the work on Markov/semi-Markov decision processes and Markov (stochastic) games can be viewed as special cases of the developments in this paper.


1992 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 56-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arbind K. Lal ◽  
Sagnik Sinha

Semi-Markov games are investigated under discounted and limiting average payoff criteria. The issue of the existence of the value and a pair of stationary optimal strategies are settled; the optimality equation is studied and under a natural ergodic condition the existence of a solution to the optimality equation is proved for the limiting average case. Semi-Markov games provide useful flexibility in constructing recursive game models. All the work on Markov/semi-Markov decision processes and Markov (stochastic) games can be viewed as special cases of the developments in this paper.


2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
David González-Sánchez ◽  
Fernando Luque-Vásquez ◽  
J. Adolfo Minjárez-Sosa

2001 ◽  
Vol 03 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 253-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. R. MOHAN ◽  
S. K. NEOGY ◽  
T. PARTHASARATHY

In this paper, we survey the recent literature on computing the value vector and the associated optimal strategies of the players for special cases of zero-sum stochastic games, or in computing a Nash equilibrium point and the corresponding stationary strategies of the players for special cases of nonzero-sum stochastic games, using finite-step algorithms based on pivoting. Examples of finite-step pivoting algorithms are the various simplex-type algorithms, such as the primal simplex or dual simplex method for solving the linear programming problem or Lemke's or Lemke-Howson's algorithm for solving the linear complementarity problem. Also included are Lemke-type algorithms for solving various generalisations of the linear complementarity problem. The survey also includes a few new results and observations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (04) ◽  
pp. 1950011
Author(s):  
Brian R. Powers

We consider a final-offer arbitration problem between two players with two quantitative issues in dispute. We model the problem as a zero-sum game where the arbiter’s opinion is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution and derive the only possible pure strategies regardless of the choice of [Formula: see text] metric used by the arbiter.


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