Study on Cross-Basin Ecological Compensation Mechanism and Compensation Standard

Water resources in China’s river basins are scarce, and the pollution that shrouds them is serious. Constant disputes have emerged between the upstream and downstream sectors due to the contamination of river basins. Moreover, China’s research on ecological compensation mechanisms and compensation standards is still immature at present. Thus, this study establishes a compensation model and introduces the compensation coefficient K, including the compensation coefficient K1 between the upstream and downstream governments and the compensation coefficient K2 between the upstream government and the central government. This paper adopts the Bargain Game Model and obtains the value of K2 through the decision-making process between the central government and the upstream local government. In addition, amendment to the final offer arbitration law is used to acquire the value of K1 by proving the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. Then, this paper takes the Taohe River Basin as an example and combines the compensation model to analyze, using the simplified compensation function to determine the amount of emission pollution from upstream to downstream and the compensation that upstream should receive.

How discounts impact IPOs valuation performance and underpricing? A confrontation between warranted and unwarranted discounts

Purpose: We investigated the different impacts warranted and unwarranted discounts have on IPOs valuation performance and underpricing. Research methodology: We used multivariate ordinary least squares regression analysis to examine discounts’ determinants, and their impacts on valuation errors and underpricing. We also used bias and accuracy errors to examine valuation performance. Results: We find both final offer price accuracy errors and underpricing negatively related to warranted discounts and positively related to unwarranted discounts. Additionally, warranted discounts are positively related to fair value estimate bias errors, contrarily to unwarranted discounts. Limitations: The relatively small sample size represents our study’s main limitation. Contribution: Unwarranted discounts allow assessing by issuers' underpricing level and underwriters’ sub-optimal efforts and investors' positive returns. Whereas warranted discounts allow issuers to avoid overpricing IPOs and communicate their intrinsic value, investors assess their negative returns, and underwriters reveal their superior qualitative valuation. Regulators can increase after-market efficiency and protect investors by implementing unwarranted discounts’ constraints and warranted discounts’ thresholds.

Building Information Modeling in Quebec’s Procurement for Public Infrastructure: A Case for Integrated Project Delivery

The Province of Quebec is currently in the process of adopting building information modeling (BIM) for major infrastructure projects. However, legal and contractual concerns such as the tendering process, adjudication criteria, intellectual property and risk–reward sharing mechanisms hinder the implementation of an efficient BIM process. This paper addresses the following question: How do norms, whether legislative, regulatory or contractual, functionally or dysfunctionally affect the effective implementation of BIM in Quebec’s public infrastructure framework? This paper suggests that the use of Integrated Project Delivery (IPD) should help mitigate legal barriers hindering BIM implementation, while preserving balance between fairness and encouraging collaboration. Quebec’s normative framework, which includes legislation, regulations, contracts and infra-regulatory rules, should be modified to standardize collaborative mechanisms, integrate two-stage negotiated processes such as rank-and-run or best and final offer and enable the assessment of tenderers’ objective qualities and more subjective qualities. Furthermore, a risk–reward sharing mechanism should be implemented through target costing, and upstream participation from a wide range of stakeholders should be encouraged.

2 The Formation of the Reinsurance Contract

This chapter discusses the formation of the reinsurance contract. A reinsurance contract is formed according to normal contractual principles. There needs to be an offer and an acceptance of that offer to form an agreement, with consideration for the bargain and an intention by the parties to create legal relations between them. The relationship between reinsurer and reinsured may be one of utmost good faith when concluding the contract, but the essential requirements for the formation of a contract are the same. The final offer and acceptance are the mechanisms for the formation of a reinsurance contract. A broker is normally (at least for most purposes) the agent of the reinsured for the purposes of the placement of the reinsurance. Ultimately, it is always important to look at the reality of the legal relationships and not rely on the superficial appearance of who is making an offer to whom. The chapter then looks at the Market Reform Contract (MRC) slip.

Do Discounts Enhance or Degrade IPOs Valuation Performance?

In the present study, we investigate the impact of discounts on the valuation performance of initial public offerings. Review of existing literature reveals that such valuation performance lacks examination in terms of discounts as most studies focus on valuation methods. Accordingly, we examine the valuation performance of initial public offerings before and after applying discounts. Whereby, underwriters apply a deliberate discount to fair value estimate before setting the final offer price. We assess the valuation performance of initial public offerings through bias and accuracy errors as well as explainability. When valuation errors are low, the valuation performance is deemed superior. Our sample consists of 39 initial public offerings conducted on the Moroccan stock exchange between 2004 and 2018. We use publicly available prospectus to collect necessary data. Our results reveal that discounts applied to fair value estimate when setting the final offer price reduce valuation errors. Consequently, discounts enhance the valuation performance of initial public offerings. In fact, both optimistic and pessimistic final offer price are closer to market price in comparison with optimistic and pessimistic fair value estimate. We conclude that if valuations conducted by underwriters are objective, discounts serve as a qualitative valuation to supplement the quantitative one. This qualitative valuation incorporates relevant information about market circumstances with regard to initial public offerings. This indicates the superior fundamental analysis underwriters are capable of performing. However, if valuations conducted by underwriters are subjective, then underwriters deliberately overestimates fair value estimate to justify applying discounts when setting the final offer price. Nonetheless, our study reveals that discounts are more than proportional to valuation optimism. Consequently, while discounts absorb this valuation optimism, they also set a valuation pessimism. In other words, discounts avoid overpricing initial public offerings, yet they result in underpricing them. Interestingly, we discover that although optimistic fair value estimate and pessimistic final offer price have approximate valuation errors, underwriters are more comfortable underpricing initial public offerings than overpricing them.