scholarly journals Reverse auction mechanism design for the acquisition of prototyping services in a manufacturing-as-a-service marketplace

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 134-143 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepak Pahwa ◽  
Binil Starly ◽  
Paul Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Auction Mechanism

scholarly journals Online Multi-Attribute Reverse Auction Mechanism Design Based on Utility

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 405-410
Author(s):  
Yan Yue Zhou ◽  
Chen Li ◽  
Ge Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Utility Function ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Active Participation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Reverse Auction ◽  
English Auction ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Negotiation Mechanism ◽  
Flow Of Information

A good auction mechanism is able to release the information who owns to the other side who lacks of. In order to ensure a positive flow of information and to improve the active participation of suppliers, negotiation mechanism is introduced, and suppliers can participate in the design of auction mechanism. Several rounds of English auction is applied to determining the final winner. Taking into account that the buyer has a preference on the property, we use AHP to calculate final weights, and use multi-attribute utility function to calculate the greatest utility as the winner.

An efficient reverse auction mechanism for limited supplier base

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-182 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arun K. Ray ◽  
Mamata Jenamani ◽  
Pratap K.J. Mohapatra
Keyword(s):  
Reverse Auction ◽  
Auction Mechanism

scholarly journals A Comprehensive Survey on Auction Mechanism Design for Cloud/Edge Resource Management and Pricing

IEEE Access ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
pp. 126502-126529
Author(s):  
Nafiseh Sharghivand ◽  
Farnaz Derakhshan ◽  
Nazli Siasi
Keyword(s):  
Resource Management ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Comprehensive Survey

A Mechanism Design for Managing Emissions in Energy Supply Sector

2013 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 94-102
Author(s):  
Ken Nagasaka ◽  
◽  
Hiroshi Takamori ◽  
Eiroku Go ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Program Implementation ◽  
Co2 Emission ◽  
Energy Supply ◽  
Behavioral Model ◽  
Auction Mechanism ◽  
Strategic Design ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Clear Presentation

The strategic design for a program for managing the commons involves devising a scheme where those regulated are not trapped into inefficient equilibrium of moral hazardous behavior. This paper studies the auctionmechanism for allocating allowance or licenses for CO2 emission and also pricing transferable allowance. For the sake of clear presentation, we use a behavioral model of an electricity supplier firm to define key ingredients in the auction mechanism. Program implementation is evaluated by simulating the firm’s response to various levels of constraint under the program.

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