Leadership with Imperfect Monitoring

2021 ◽  
pp. 101589
Author(s):  
Gerald Eisenkopf ◽  
Christian Walter
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Monitoring

scholarly journals Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring

Econometrica ◽  
1990 ◽  
Vol 58 (5) ◽  
pp. 1041 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dilip Abreu ◽  
David Pearce ◽  
Ennio Stacchetti
Keyword(s):  
Repeated Games ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring

scholarly journals Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

1986 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-269 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dilip Abreu ◽  
David Pearce ◽  
Ennio Stacchetti
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Monitoring

Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-796
Author(s):  
Anna Sanktjohanser
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
Repeated Game ◽  
Discount Factor ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Monitoring Cost ◽  
Private Signals ◽  
Public Message

I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms’ payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe. (JEL C73, D43, D82, L12)

Optimal collusion under imperfect monitoring in multimarket contact

2012 ◽  
Vol 76 (2) ◽  
pp. 636-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hajime Kobayashi ◽  
Katsunori Ohta
Keyword(s):  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Multimarket Contact
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