Endogenous Monitoring in a Partnership Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (3) ◽  
pp. 776-796
Author(s):  
Anna Sanktjohanser

I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to obtain private signals of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signals obtained and the amount to be paid in return. First, with a low monitoring cost, collusive equilibria exist. Second, collusive equilibria are monitor-preferred. Third, in monitor-preferred equilibria, firms’ payoffs are decreasing in the discount factor. My model helps explain cartel agreements between self-interested parties and firms in legal industries in the United States and Europe. (JEL C73, D43, D82, L12)

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 1586-1621
Author(s):  
Min Zhang ◽  
Jia Pan

This paper derives the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) transfer scheme, UI benefits, and UI contribution fees: When a worker has to earn his or her UI eligibility through work, the UI benefits do not last forever, and the UI agency has imperfect monitoring power on the strategic behavior of the worker. We show that the consideration of the UI eligibility rule generates the effective entitlement effect, which serves as an additional incentive device and alters the nature of the optimal UI transfer scheme established in literature. In contrast with previous studies, we find that when the effective entitlement effect is large, it completely removes the moral hazards in job searches, job acceptances, and job quits. As a result, the optimal UI benefits and contribution fees become constant. Calibrated to the data in the United States, the model reproduces some key features of the existing UI system.


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (10) ◽  
pp. 3123-3159
Author(s):  
Nathan H. Miller ◽  
Gloria Sheu ◽  
Matthew C. Weinberg

We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable from data on prices and quantities using the model’s structure. In an application to the beer industry, we find that price leadership increases profit relative to Bertrand competition by 17 percent in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and by 22 percent in 2010 and 2011, with the change mostly due to consolidation. We simulate two mergers, which relax binding incentive compatibility constraints and increase supermarkups. These coordinated effects arise even with efficiencies that offset price increases under Bertrand competition. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L14, L41, L66)


Author(s):  
A. Hakam ◽  
J.T. Gau ◽  
M.L. Grove ◽  
B.A. Evans ◽  
M. Shuman ◽  
...  

Prostate adenocarcinoma is the most common malignant tumor of men in the United States and is the third leading cause of death in men. Despite attempts at early detection, there will be 244,000 new cases and 44,000 deaths from the disease in the United States in 1995. Therapeutic progress against this disease is hindered by an incomplete understanding of prostate epithelial cell biology, the availability of human tissues for in vitro experimentation, slow dissemination of information between prostate cancer research teams and the increasing pressure to “ stretch” research dollars at the same time staff reductions are occurring.To meet these challenges, we have used the correlative microscopy (CM) and client/server (C/S) computing to increase productivity while decreasing costs. Critical elements of our program are as follows:1) Establishing the Western Pennsylvania Genitourinary (GU) Tissue Bank which includes >100 prostates from patients with prostate adenocarcinoma as well as >20 normal prostates from transplant organ donors.


Author(s):  
Vinod K. Berry ◽  
Xiao Zhang

In recent years it became apparent that we needed to improve productivity and efficiency in the Microscopy Laboratories in GE Plastics. It was realized that digital image acquisition, archiving, processing, analysis, and transmission over a network would be the best way to achieve this goal. Also, the capabilities of quantitative image analysis, image transmission etc. available with this approach would help us to increase our efficiency. Although the advantages of digital image acquisition, processing, archiving, etc. have been described and are being practiced in many SEM, laboratories, they have not been generally applied in microscopy laboratories (TEM, Optical, SEM and others) and impact on increased productivity has not been yet exploited as well.In order to attain our objective we have acquired a SEMICAPS imaging workstation for each of the GE Plastic sites in the United States. We have integrated the workstation with the microscopes and their peripherals as shown in Figure 1.


2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (01) ◽  
pp. 53-87 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Rehfeld

Every ten years, the United States “constructs” itself politically. On a decennial basis, U.S. Congressional districts are quite literally drawn, physically constructing political representation in the House of Representatives on the basis of where one lives. Why does the United States do it this way? What justifies domicile as the sole criteria of constituency construction? These are the questions raised in this article. Contrary to many contemporary understandings of representation at the founding, I argue that there were no principled reasons for using domicile as the method of organizing for political representation. Even in 1787, the Congressional district was expected to be far too large to map onto existing communities of interest. Instead, territory should be understood as forming a habit of mind for the founders, even while it was necessary to achieve other democratic aims of representative government.


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