Note on the equal split solution in an n-person noncooperative bargaining game

Toshiji Miyakawa

doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.005

Note on the equal split solution in an n-person noncooperative bargaining game

Mathematical Social Sciences ◽

10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.10.005 ◽

2008 ◽

Vol 55 (3) ◽

pp. 281-291 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Toshiji Miyakawa

Keyword(s):

Bargaining Game ◽

Noncooperative Bargaining ◽

Equal Split

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Bargaining power does not matter when sharing losses – Experimental evidence of equal split in the Nash bargaining game

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ◽

10.1016/j.jebo.2014.10.009 ◽

2014 ◽

Vol 108 ◽

pp. 261-272 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

Eike B. Kroll ◽

Ralf Morgenstern ◽

Thomas Neumann ◽

Stephan Schosser ◽

Bodo Vogt

Keyword(s):

Experimental Evidence ◽

Bargaining Power ◽

Bargaining Game ◽

Nash Bargaining ◽

Nash Bargaining Game ◽

Equal Split

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Driving a Hard Bargain is a Balancing Act: How social preferences constrain the negotiation process

10.31235/osf.io/5kw3f ◽

2021 ◽

Author(s):

Yola Engler ◽

Lionel Page

Keyword(s):

Social Preferences ◽

Negotiation Process ◽

Bargaining Game ◽

Bargaining Outcome ◽

Equal Split ◽

First Offers ◽

Made In

We investigate the haggling process in bargaining. Using an experimental bargaining game, we find that a first offer has a significant impact on the bargaining outcome even if it is costless to reject. First offers convey information on the player’s reservation value induced by his social preferences. They are most often accepted when they are not above the equal split. However, offers which request much more than the equal split induce punishing counteroffers. The bargaining outcome is therefore critically influenced by the balance of toughness and kindness signaled through the offers made in the haggling phase.

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Voting and Vetoing

American Political Science Review ◽

10.2307/2945844 ◽

1996 ◽

Vol 90 (4) ◽

pp. 813-823 ◽

Cited By ~ 55

Author(s):

Eyal Winter

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Security Council ◽

Bargaining Game ◽

Veto Power ◽

Bargaining Theory ◽

Equilibrium Outcome ◽

Un Security Council ◽

Quantitative Results ◽

Noncooperative Bargaining

The consequences of veto power in committees is analyzed using the approach of noncooperative bargaining theory. It is first shown that in equilibrium nonveto players do not share in the benefits gained by the decision making of the committee, that is, in every equilibrium outcome of the bargaining game, nonveto players earn zero. Some measures for reducing the excessive power of veto members in committees are analyzed. Specifically, I study the effects of imposing a deadline on negotiations and of expanding the committee by increasing the number of nonveto players. Quantitative results are given for the case of the UN Security Council.

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