Social optimality in quantum Bayesian games

The use of anti-forensic techniques is a very common practice that stealthy adversaries may deploy to minimise their traces and make the investigation of an incident harder by evading detection and attribution. In this paper, we study the interaction between a cyber forensic Investigator and a strategic Attacker using a game-theoretic framework. This is based on a Bayesian game of incomplete information played on a multi-host cyber forensics investigation graph of actions traversed by both players. The edges of the graph represent players’ actions across different hosts in a network. In alignment with the concept of Bayesian games, we define two Attacker types to represent their ability of deploying anti-forensic techniques to conceal their activities. In this way, our model allows the Investigator to identify the optimal investigating policy taking into consideration the cost and impact of the available actions, while coping with the uncertainty of the Attacker’s type and strategic decisions. To evaluate our model, we construct a realistic case study based on threat reports and data extracted from the MITRE ATT&CK STIX repository, Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), and interviews with cyber-security practitioners. We use the case study to compare the performance of the proposed method against two other investigative methods and three different types of Attackers.

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Monopolistic competition model: The impact of technological innovation on equilibrium and social optimality

Automation and Remote Control ◽

10.1134/s0005117917030134 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 78 (3) ◽

pp. 537-556 ◽

Cited By ~ 8

Author(s):

I. V. Antoshchenkova ◽

I. A. Bykadorov

Keyword(s):

Technological Innovation ◽

Monopolistic Competition ◽

Competition Model ◽

The Impact ◽

Social Optimality

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Market, timber pricing, and forest management

The Forestry Chronicle ◽

10.5558/tfc86580-5 ◽

2010 ◽

Vol 86 (5) ◽

pp. 580-588 ◽

Cited By ~ 2

Author(s):

Shashi Kant

Keyword(s):

Forest Management ◽

Economic Efficiency ◽

Sustainable Forest Management ◽

The United States ◽

Residual Value ◽

Market Economic ◽

Geographical Regions ◽

Optimal Mix ◽

Optimal Resource ◽

Social Optimality

Some resource economists and policy-makers believe that market mechanisms in general and timber pricing through auctions specifically are the only solutions for forest management in Canada. In this paper, simple economic concepts of market, economic efficiency, and social optimality are discussed, and the specific features of forest resources and sustainable forest management and their implications for optimal resource allocation through the market are highlighted. Economic theory behind competitive timber pricing in two geographical regions is presented to demonstrate that in a competitive setting, the prices of timber need not be the same in the two regions. Timber pricing mechanisms used by different countries are summarized, and auctions, their limitations, and some important outcomes of timber auctions by the United States Forest Service are discussed. Market performances of residual value and auction-based timber pricing are compared. On the basis of these discussions, it is inferred that sustainable forest management cannot be achieved either by the market or by government-controlled mechanisms only. An optimal-mix of the market and government-controlled mechanisms is the only answer to achieve sustainable forest management. Key words: auction, Canada, economic efficiency, market, residual value, social optimality, sustainable forest management, timber pricing

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