Emergence of cooperation with reputation-updating timescale in spatial public goods game

2021 ◽  
Vol 393 ◽  
pp. 127173
Author(s):  
Weiwei Han ◽  
Zhipeng Zhang ◽  
Junqing Sun ◽  
Chengyi Xia
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

Emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional participation

2013 ◽  
Vol 392 (8) ◽  
pp. 1840-1847 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming Li ◽  
Chun-Xiao Jia ◽  
Run-Ran Liu ◽  
Bing-Hong Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

Leadership by example promotes the emergence of cooperation in public goods game

2017 ◽  
Vol 101 ◽  
pp. 100-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Tong Chen ◽  
Yongjie Wang
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

Evolutionary Dynamics of Cooperation in a Corrupt Society with Anti-Corruption Control

2021 ◽  
Vol 31 (03) ◽  
pp. 2150039
Author(s):  
Linjie Liu ◽  
Xiaojie Chen
Keyword(s):  
System Dynamics ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Social Exclusion ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Parameter Range ◽  
Heteroclinic Cycle ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation

The importance of cooperation is self-evident to humans, yet the existence of corruption where law violators can avoid being punished by paying bribes to corrupt law enforcers may threaten the maintenance of cooperation. Although powerful monitoring has been used to resolve such matters, existing studies show that the effects of such measures are either transient or uncertain. Thus how to efficiently control the occurrence of corruption for the emergence of cooperation remains a challenge. Here, we introduce social exclusion into the public goods game, and respectively propose three measures to control corruption, namely, the exclusion of corrupt punishers, the exclusion of corrupt defectors, and the exclusion of both corrupt punishers and corrupt defectors. Our results show that the system dynamics driven by these three measures can exhibit many interesting dynamical outcomes including the dominance of defectors, rock-scissors-paper cycle, heteroclinic cycle, or interior attractor. We further demonstrate that excluding corrupt punishers can improve the situation of corruption more efficiently than excluding corrupt defectors. In addition, excluding both corrupt defectors and corrupt punishers can more effectively promote the emergence of cooperation for a broad parameter range.

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