MEASURING THE Informativeness OF EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENTS: THE ROLE OF EVENT Windows

Author(s):  
Somnath Das ◽  
Alexander Z. King
2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 1805-1838 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nic Schaub

This study investigates whether financial data providers serve as information intermediaries in capital markets. To this end, I examine whether the timeliness of earnings information disseminated by First Call (Thomson Reuters) affects the market’s reaction to earnings announcements. I document that the immediate price and volume response is weaker and the post-earnings-announcement drift stronger for earnings news disseminated with a delay by First Call. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, I study the market reaction on the day of the delayed dissemination and show that a significant part of the stronger drift is clustered around this day.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles M. C. Lee ◽  
Christina Zhu

We use trade-level data to examine the role of actively managed funds (AMFs) in earnings news dissemination. We find AMFs are drawn to, and participate disproportionately more in, earnings announcements (EAs) that include bundled managerial guidance. When the two pieces of news are directionally inconsistent, AMFs trade in the direction of future guidance rather than current earnings. AMFs exhibit an ability to discern, and adapt their trading to, the bias in bundled guidance. While AMF trades at EAs are generally more profitable than their non-EA trades, this result reverses when guidance bias is extreme. Overall, we find increased AMF trading during EAs leads to faster price adjustment. Collectively, these findings suggest AMFs are sophisticated processors of bundled earnings news, and their trading generally improves market price discovery.


Author(s):  
Michelle A. Draeger ◽  
Jacob Haislip ◽  
Mikhail Sterin

Companies are increasingly disclosing earnings announcements prior to the completion of the year-end audit. Earnings that are released before the audit is complete are viewed negatively by investors and are positively associated with restatements and management turnover. We examine the role of the audit committee in the timing of earnings announcements. We predict and find that more powerful audit committees are positively associated with earnings announcements issued closer to audit completion. For observations with incomplete audits, we find that more powerful audit committees are negatively associated with restatements. Finally, more powerful audit committees are associated with delays in the earnings announcement. Our primary results are robust to the use of an entropy-balanced control sample and company fixed effects. These results indicate that audit committees play a role in earnings announcement timeliness and reliability, and have implications for researchers, investors, and regulators.


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