Optimal unemployment insurance in an estimated job search model with savings

2009 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasmus Lentz
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 281-312 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Lawson

A common finding of the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature is that the optimal replacement rate is around 50 percent; however, a key assumption is that UI is the only government spending activity. I show that optimal UI levels may be dramatically reduced when UI is a small part of overall spending: the negative impact of UI on income tax revenues implies added welfare costs, a mechanism that I call a fiscal externality. Using both a standard calibrated structural job search model and a “sufficient statistics” method, I find that the optimal replacement rate is zero when fiscal externalities are incorporated. (JEL E24, H24, J64, J65)


1999 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 1039-1074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Bontemps ◽  
Jean-Marc Robin ◽  
Gerard J. Van den Berg
Keyword(s):  

2006 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Leora Friedberg ◽  
Michael T Owyang ◽  
Tara M Sinclair

Abstract Recent declines in job tenure have coincided with a shift away from traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions, which reward long tenure. New evidence also points to an increase in job-to-job movements by workers, and we document gains in relative wages of job-to-job movers over a similar period. We develop a search model in which firms may offer tenure-based contracts like DB pensions to reduce the incidence of costly on-the-job search by workers. Either reduced search costs or an increase in the probability of job matches can, under fairly general conditions, lower the value of deterring search and the use of DB pensions.


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