Fiscal Externalities and Optimal Unemployment Insurance
2017 ◽
Vol 9
(4)
◽
pp. 281-312
◽
Keyword(s):
A common finding of the optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature is that the optimal replacement rate is around 50 percent; however, a key assumption is that UI is the only government spending activity. I show that optimal UI levels may be dramatically reduced when UI is a small part of overall spending: the negative impact of UI on income tax revenues implies added welfare costs, a mechanism that I call a fiscal externality. Using both a standard calibrated structural job search model and a “sufficient statistics” method, I find that the optimal replacement rate is zero when fiscal externalities are incorporated. (JEL E24, H24, J64, J65)
2009 ◽
Vol 12
(1)
◽
pp. 37-57
◽
2018 ◽
Vol 10
(2)
◽
pp. 152-181
◽
Keyword(s):
An Empirical Equilibrium Job Search Model With Search on the Job and Heterogeneous Workers and Firms
1999 ◽
Vol 40
(4)
◽
pp. 1039-1074
◽
Keyword(s):