What you get is not what you paid for: new evidence from a lab experiment on negative externalities and information asymmetries

Author(s):  
Maria Eduarda Fernandes ◽  
Marieta Valente
2018 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 424-450 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Barboza

Purpose This paper’s main objective is to expand the demand-driven strategic field by developing a model where endogenization of consumers’ preferences for clean(er) products becomes the driver of the firm green corporate social responsible (GCSR) profit maximization behavior. Design/methodology/approach The model proposes that in undifferentiated markets, firms using a conventional technology manage production-related negative externalities via information asymmetries. In turn, when consumer socially responsible individuals (CnSR) discover the nature of the information asymmetries, they then reveal their preferences. The building block of the model is that CnSR derive value both from intrinsic as well as extrinsic product features, and derive negative satisfaction from the production negative externalities. In turn, CnSR preferences offer a higher willingness to pay for a combined intrinsic (private good and direct utility) and extrinsic (public good and feel good–do good utility) product. Findings The model demonstrates that the firm’s GCSR behavior is a technological-driven process directly affecting the extrinsic component of the product through the development of a safe technology, and exclusively targeting CnSR type of consumers. The corollary of the model is that for the firm pursuing a GCSR behavior, the development of a competitive advantage with higher firm performance leads to profit maximization when exclusively serving the GCSR segment of the market. Thus, GCSR is the result of unusual innovation efforts. Originality/value This paper presents a model that expands the field of strategic management through the demand-driven incorporation and respective modeling. To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is the first model to explicitly develop this relationship in this format.


2019 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Barboza ◽  
Valerien Pede ◽  
Sergio Madero

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to model the role that stakeholders, and especially social responsible consumers play in the process of finding a win–win solution to control production related negative externalities. In this regard, when information asymmetries are present and consumers become knowledgeable about them, consumers with d-preferences for corporate social responsibility (CSR) type of products becomes the driver of the firm strategy. Design/methodology/approach To accomplish the goals of this paper, the authors proceed to develop a series of theoretical models wherein the social gains and costs of alternative modes of intervention are illustrated. The authors begin with a standard Pigouvian tax model and construct a stakeholder equivalent tax model and finalize the analysis with consumers acting in a shared social responsible behavior with firms as the optimal solution model. Findings The authors show that proactive disclosure of information asymmetries regarding negative externalities develops a shared social responsibility between consumers and firms. Market-based solutions to the externality problem are achieved under this setting. This solution is preferred to a Pigouvian tax and to a stakeholder equivalent tax. It is concluded that shared social responsibility is the result of the interaction of consumers with d-preferences and the reaction of a socially responsible “firm” willing, and the authors are able to incorporate these preferences as drivers for its strategy. Research limitations/implications The main limitation of this paper is in its theoretical nature and specific applications to one case, that of negative externalities in production processes. The implication of this is that the model herein developed needs to be put to the empirical test. Social implications The overall social implications indicate that active reduction of information asymmetries is welfare improving and preferred to government intervention. Originality/value This paper is original as it makes use of economic principles to develop a parsimonious model to demonstrate that proactive actions of a firm in response to consumers and stakeholders demands leads to an overall social welfare improvement when negative externalities deriving from production are incorporated into the decision making process of both consumers and firms. These decisions prove superior to government regulations.


1978 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 31-35
Author(s):  
R. B. Hanson

Several outstanding problems affecting the existing parallaxes should be resolved to form a coherent system for the new General Catalogue proposed by van Altena, as well as to improve luminosity calibrations and other parallax applications. Lutz has reviewed several of these problems, such as: (A) systematic differences between observatories, (B) external error estimates, (C) the absolute zero point, and (D) systematic observational effects (in right ascension, declination, apparent magnitude, etc.). Here we explore the use of cluster and spectroscopic parallaxes, and the distributions of observed parallaxes, to bring new evidence to bear on these classic problems. Several preliminary results have been obtained.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (9) ◽  
pp. 36
Author(s):  
BRUCE JANCIN
Keyword(s):  

2001 ◽  
Vol 58 (6) ◽  
pp. 362-366 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matius P. Stürchler ◽  
R. P. Steffen
Keyword(s):  

Impfungen sind einfache und effektive Maßnahmen zur Verhinderung von Reisekrankheiten. Compliance-Probleme sind gering, da alle Impfungen noch vor Abreise verabreicht werden und bei manchen Impfungen nur eine Dosis für den zuverlässigen Schutz nötig ist. Für jeden Reisenden sind die Hepatitis A- und die Diphtherie-Tetanus-Impfung empfohlen, für Asien und Afrika auch die Polioimpfung. Bei Reisen >30 Tagen, jüngeren Personen und Reisenden mit Risikoverhalten sollte immer auch eine Hepatitis B-Impfung, eventuell als Kombination mit Hepatitis A in Betracht gezogen werden. Je nach Reisestil, -destination und -dauer können auch weitere Impfungen wie z.B. die Typhus-, Tollwut-, Zeckenenzephalitis-, Grippe-, Masern-Mumps-Röteln-, Gelbfieber-, Meningokokkenmeningitis- und die Japanische Enzephalitis-Impfung in Frage kommen. Mehrere Impfungen können gleichzeitig verabreicht werden – eine Staffelung ist nicht nötig. i BAG Supplementum VI, Stand Juli 2000 «Impfungen für Auslandreisende»; http://www.admin.ch/bag/infekt/prev/reisemed/index.htm; Safetravel http://www.safetravel.ch; Tropimed


1997 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen J. Lupker ◽  
Tamsen E. Taylor ◽  
Penny M. Pexman

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