The temporal pattern of trading rule returns and exchange rate intervention: intervention does not generate technical trading profits

2002 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 211-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher J. Neely
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Temporal Pattern ◽  
Trading Rule ◽  
Technical Trading ◽  
Trading Profits ◽  
Exchange Rate Intervention

Trading Rule Profitability and Central Bank Interventions in the Dollar-Deutsch mark Market / Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Profitabilität einer technischen Handelsstrategie und Zentralbankinterventionen im D-Mark/US-Dollar-Markt

2004 ◽  
Vol 224 (6) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Frenkel ◽  
Georg Stadtmann
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Exchange Rates ◽  
Moving Average ◽  
Trading Rule ◽  
Technical Trading ◽  
Var Analysis ◽  
Us Dollar ◽  
Central Bank Interventions ◽  
The Relationship

SummaryThe paper examines the relationship between central bank interventions in the dollar-deutschmark market and the profitability of technical trading for the period 1979-1992. While previous work on this topic focused on the interventions of the Fed, we include data on Bundesbank interventions and show that there were several similarities. Our analysis yields the result that eliminating days of Fed and Bundesbank interventions causes a simple moving average trading rule to become unprofitable. In addition, we study the dynamics of intra-day exchange rates following and preceding interventions and provide a VAR analysis on the relationship between interventions and the change in the exchange rate. The results suggest that interventions did not cause the high profits of technical trading on intervention days frequently found in other studies.

scholarly journals Optimal Foreign Exchange Rate Intervention in Lévy Markets

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Masimba Aspinas Mutakaya ◽  
Eriyoti Chikodza ◽  
Edward T. Chiyaka
Keyword(s):  
Exchange Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Impulse Control ◽  
Value Function ◽  
Quasivariational Inequalities ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
A Value ◽  
The Exchange Rate ◽  
Intervention Costs ◽  
Exchange Rate Intervention

This paper considers an exchange rate problem in Lévy markets, where the Central Bank has to intervene. We assume that, in the absence of control, the exchange rate evolves according to Brownian motion with a jump component. The Central Bank is allowed to intervene in order to keep the exchange rate as close as possible to a prespecified target value. The interventions by the Central Bank are associated with costs. We present the situation as an impulse control problem, where the objective of the bank is to minimize the intervention costs. In particular, the paper extends the model by Huang, 2009, to incorporate a jump component. We formulate and prove an optimal verification theorem for the impulse control. We then propose an impulse control and construct a value function and then verify that they solve the quasivariational inequalities. Our results suggest that if the expected number of jumps is high the Central Bank will intervene more frequently and with large intervention amounts hence the intervention costs will be high.

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