This Chapter introduces the market for corporate control and provides theoretical and empirical context about the functioning and effects of the market for corporate control. Ideally such context should inform the analysis and evaluation of the Takeover Code’s regulation of the UK market for corporate control. However, as the Chapter shows, neither our understanding of the likely effects of the market for corporate control on companies, boards, shareholders and stakeholders, nor the state of empirical evidence provide clear cut guidance on how to regulate the market for corporate control. The Chapter considers evidence on the value effects of takeovers and shows that evidence from the short term market response to announced takeovers supports claims that takeovers in aggregate generate value, but the longer term evidence is more mixed and inconclusive. It also considers the methodological limitations of both the short term and long term evidence. The Chapter then proceeds to consider the effect of the market for corporate control on stakeholders. It explores the commonly held view that takeovers are detrimental for employees but finds again that the empirical evidence is inconclusive, although the theoretical case that takeover activity may undermine employee investment in the business remains compelling. The Chapter then explores the role of the market for corporate control as a governance device. It is often assumed that the market for corporate control acts as a disciplinary device holding managers to account, but as the Chapter shows the disciplinary effects work differently and less precisely than regulators and the public debate commonly assume. The Chapter also shows that such indirect effects may also mould management and board behaviour in economically suboptimal ways, which the Chapter considers in the context of the debate about the possible short term orientation of UK boards.
Theory, Evidence, and Policy on Dual-Class Shares: A Country-Specific Response to a Global Debate
