scholarly journals Firm performance and the political economy of corporate governance: survey evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia

2001 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 85-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick Paul Walsh ◽  
Ciara Whelan
2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 449-482 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter A. Hall ◽  
Daniel W. Gingerich

This article provides a statistical analysis of core contentions of the ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective on comparative capitalism. The authors construct indices to assess whether patterns of co-ordination in the OECD economies conform to the predictions of the theory and compare the correspondence of institutions across subspheres of the political economy. They test whether institutional complementarities occur across these subspheres by estimating the impact of complementarities in labour relations and corporate governance on growth rates. To assess the durability of varieties of capitalism, they report on the extent of institutional change in the 1980s and 1990s. Powerful interaction effects across institutions in the subspheres of the political economy must be considered if assessments of the economic impact of institutional reform in any one sphere are to be accurate.


2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-326 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Clarke

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to trace the evolution of corporate governance through a series of changing paradigms in response to wider transformations in the political economy, business and society. The different eras of governance, and the dominant theoretical and practical paradigms are highlighted. In a context where the adequacy of the dominant paradigms of corporate governance is increasingly challenged, the search for coherent new paradigms is a vital task in corporate governance. Design/methodology/approach – This paper is a conceptual analysis of evolving paradigms in corporate governance. Findings – To meet the imminent challenge of social and environmental sustainability in a post-carbon economy, further rethinking of corporate purpose, corporate governance and directors duties will be essential. This sustainability revolution has only just commenced, but in the course of the twenty-first century, it will transform both business and society. Research limitations/implications – The implications of the research concern the importance of conceptualising corporate governance through different eras and paradigms, and appreciating that further paradigm shifts will occur in response to transformations in the political economy and ecology. Practical implications – This paper informs on the importance of the transformation of business purpose and objectives in response to the imminent dangers of environmental and social collapse. Social implications – This paper emphasises the social and environmental dimensions of corporate activity, and how these must be considered in the definition of wealth generation. Originality/value – The contribution of this paper is to focus upon the increasing integration of corporate governance and corporate sustainability, and how this is essential for the reformulation of corporate purpose and objectives.


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhinav Gupta ◽  
Adam J. Wowak

We examine how directors’ political ideologies, specifically the board-level average of how conservative or liberal directors are, influence boards’ decisions about CEO compensation. Integrating research on corporate governance and political psychology, we theorize that conservative and liberal boards will differ in their prevailing beliefs about the appropriate amounts CEOs should be paid and, relatedly, the extent to which CEOs should be rewarded or penalized for recent firm performance. Using a donation-based index to measure the political ideologies of directors serving on S&P 1500 company boards, we test our ideas on a sample of over 4,000 CEOs from 1998 to 2013. Consistent with our predictions, we show that conservative boards pay CEOs more than liberal boards and that the relationship between recent firm performance and CEO pay is stronger for conservative boards than for liberal boards. We further demonstrate that these relationships are more pronounced when focusing specifically on the directors most heavily involved in designing CEO pay plans—members of compensation committees. By showing that board ideology manifests in CEO pay, we offer an initial demonstration of the potentially wide-ranging implications of political ideology for how corporations are governed.


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