Cognitive Theories of Crime

2021 ◽  
pp. 19-34
Author(s):  
Clive R. Hollin
Keyword(s):  
1976 ◽  
Vol 21 (8) ◽  
pp. 557-558
Author(s):  
ROBERT J. STERNBERG

2013 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 151-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Pernice-Duca ◽  
Barry Markman ◽  
Heather Chateauvert

Author(s):  
Linda-Ruth Salter

Linda-Ruth Salter deals with the ways in which hearing contributes to the realities we create and within which we live. Discussing different cognitive theories and findings from neuroscience, she details how sensory data—specifically auditory stimuli—are processed, and how this processing activates imagination in determining who we are, how we are, and where we are. Reality, Salter argues, is a cognitive construct. Hearing plays a significant part in forming that reality—for example, by guiding our attention to certain stimuli rather than others—and it further helps us to successfully inhabit our constructed reality.


Diagnosis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 169-176 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerusalem Merkebu ◽  
Michael Battistone ◽  
Kevin McMains ◽  
Kathrine McOwen ◽  
Catherine Witkop ◽  
...  

AbstractThe diagnostic error crisis suggests a shift in how we view clinical reasoning and may be vital for transforming how we view clinical encounters. Building upon the literature, we propose clinical reasoning and error are context-specific and proceed to advance a family of theories that represent a model outlining the complex interplay of physician, patient, and environmental factors driving clinical reasoning and error. These contemporary social cognitive theories (i.e. embedded cognition, ecological psychology, situated cognition, and distributed cognition) can emphasize the dynamic interactions occurring amongst participants in particular settings. The situational determinants that contribute to diagnostic error are also explored.


2011 ◽  
Vol 23 (10) ◽  
pp. 2945-2955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Diana I. Tamir ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell

Humans enjoy a singular capacity to imagine events that differ from the “here-and-now.” Recent cognitive neuroscience research has linked such simulation processes to the brain's “default network.” However, extant cognitive theories suggest that perceivers reliably simulate only relatively proximal experiences—those that seem nearby, soon, likely to happen, or relevant to a close other. Here, we test these claims by examining spontaneous engagement of the default network while perceivers consider experiencing events from proximal and distal perspectives. Across manipulations of perspective in four dimensions, two regions of the default network—medial prefrontal cortex and retrosplenial cortex—were more active for proximal than distal events, supporting cognitive accounts that perceivers only richly simulate experiences that seem immediate and that perceivers represent different dimensions of distance similarly. Moreover, stable individual differences in default activity when thinking about distal events correlated with individual variability in an implicit measure of psychological distance, suggesting that perceivers naturally vary in their tendency to simulate far-off or unlikely experiences.


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