The Trinity, divine simplicity, and fideism – or: was Gilson right about the fourteenth century after all?

Author(s):  
Russell L. Friedman
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-159
Author(s):  
Robb Lawrence Torseth

It is a contemporary trend by many theologians and philosophers to view the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity (from hereon, DDS) as an unnecessary, illogical, and problematic addendum of scholasticism to theology proper. However, upon further investigation, this doctrine is found to be prevalent and implied in biblically orthodox ontology. Furthermore, it may be shown that the DDS bears potentially broad ramifications to how we understand the Trinity (given that it proceeds from simplicity in logical priority) and, subsequently, how we understand the initial, sustained, and perfected work of God in salvation through grace. Therefore, contrary to current theological trends, it may be stated that the DDS is, in fact, a centrifugal, practical, and even indispensablepart of the Christian understanding of how we know God. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
pp. 186-187
Author(s):  
Rocío Bruquetas Galán

  Tricks of the Medieval Trades. The Trinity Encyclopedia: A Collection of Fourteenth-Century English Craft Recipes Autor/es: Mark Clarke Editor: Archetype Publications Ltd. (31 de diciembre de 2018) ISBN-10: 1909492655 ISBN-13: 978-1909492653 Dimensiones: 210 x 297mm Páginas: 132 Idioma: Inglés


Author(s):  
Richard Cross

Duns Scotus and William of Ockham engage with Aquinas’ thought in fundamentally negative ways. They never make distinctively Thomist positions their own, and when they use Aquinas’ thought, they do so merely as a way of sharpening their own theologies through the dialectical process of rejecting an opponent’s view. This chapter first considers the role of Aquinas’ thought in Scotus’ teaching on religious language and univocity, divine simplicity and omnipresence, the Trinity, cognitive theory, the question of the first object of cognition, angelic individuation, the beatific vision, the plurality of substantial forms, free will, and normative ethics. A second section discusses Aquinas’ place in Ockham’s teaching on common natures, intuitive cognition, divine ideas, and the nature of grace.


Author(s):  
John Monfasani

Unlike most Renaissance humanists, Valla took a special interest in philosophy. However, his most influential writing was a work of grammar, Elegantiae Linguae Latinae (The Fine Points of the Latin Language); he had no comprehensive philosophy, nor did he write mainly on philosophy. Valla considered himself to be a revolutionary overturning received opinions, bragging that through his works he was ‘overturning all the wisdom of the ancients’. His preference for Quintilian over Cicero and criticism of classical authors shocked older humanists, and religious authorities were upset by his views on the Trinity and on papal authority, but Valla never sought the overthrow of classical studies – or the papacy for that matter. He sought rather to destroy the Aristotelianism then reigning in the universities. In De Vero Falsoque Bono (On the True and False Good) (1431), he argued for the superiority of Epicureanism over Stoic and Aristotelian ethics. In De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Will) (1439), he corrected Boethius’ treatment of free will and predestination. In the Dialectica (1438–9) he set out to reform logic and philosophy because he believed Aristotle had corrupted them. Asserting that Aristotle had falsified thought because he had falsified language, Valla was determined to show how logic rightly conformed to the linguistic usage of the classical literary authors; essentially Valla had aggressively revived the ancient competition between the rhetorical and philosophical traditions. The first great humanist, Francesco Petrarca (better known in English as Petrarch), had attempted something similar in the fourteenth century, but Valla’s knowledge of philosophy was greater than Petrarch’s and he had access to more sources. Furthermore, Valla knew Greek and could read texts which the medieval Aristotelians knew only in Latin translation.


2011 ◽  
Vol 91 ◽  
pp. 163-173 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Ryan Geldof

AbstractThe 1350 foundation statutes for the College of Trinity Hall, Cambridge, contain unique provisions for a corporate signum or badge. The badge was specifically assigned to the college by its founder, William Bateman, Bishop of Norwich (1289–1355). Over time Bateman's personal arms replaced this signum in identifying the college and its property. The badge is often called Bateman's personal badge, but this is not supported by the statutes of the college or by the evidence of the badge's use in surviving books in the college library. The instructions for the college signum and its specific function in the marking of the college's books represents an interesting development in the indication of corporate, rather than personal, ownership using heraldic insignia. This paper discusses Bateman's instructions for the college signum and the evolution of the Trinity Hall arms.


1994 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-88
Author(s):  
Charles J. Kelly

It is well known that Augustine, Boethius, Anselm and Aquinas participated in a tradition of philosophical theology which determined God to be simple, perfect, immutable and timelessly eternal. Within the parameters of such an Hellenic understanding of the divine nature, they sought a clarification of one of the fundamental teachings of their Christian faith, the doctrine of the Trinity. These classical theists were not dogmatists, naively unreflective about the very possibility of their project. Aquinas, for instance, explicitly worried about and fought to dispel the seeming contradiction between the philosophical requirement of divine simplicity and the creedal insistence on a threefold personhood in God.1 Nevertheless, doubts abound. Philosophers otherwise friendly to Classical Theism (CT) still remain unsure about the coherence of affirming a God that is at once absolutely simple and triune.2 A less friendly critic has even suggested that the theory of divine simplicity pressured Augustine and his medieval followers away from recognizing that real complexity within the life of God which Trinitarianism expresses.3


1989 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert M. Burns

In the Summa Theologiae ‘simplicity’ is treated as pre–eminent among the terms which may properly be used to describe the divine nature. The Question in which Thomas demonstrates that God must be ‘totally and in every way simple’ (1.3.7) immediately follows the five proofs of God's existence, preceding the treatment of His other perfections, and being frequently used as the basis for proving them. Then in Question 13 ‘univocal predication' is held to be ‘impossible between God and creatures’ so that at best ‘some things are said of God and creatures analogically’ because of the necessity of using ‘various and multiplied conceptions’ derived from our knowledge of created beings to refer to what in God is simple for ‘the perfections flowing from God to creatures… pre–exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received divided and multiplied’ (1.13.5). In line with this, in the De Potentia Dei the treatment of analogical predication is integrated into that of ‘the Simplicity of the Divine Essence’ (Q 7). Moreover, it lies at the root of Thomas's rejection of any possibility of a Trinitarian natural theology such as, for instance, St Anselm or Richard of St Victor had attempted to develop, on the grounds that ‘it is impossible to attain to the knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason’ since ‘we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence, but not what belongs to the distinction of the persons’ (1.32.1). Even modern minds sympathetic to Thomas have clearly found it difficult to understand his concern for the divine simplicity: in his Aquinas Lecture Plantinga speaks for many in stating that it is ‘a mysterious doctrine’ which is ‘exceedingly hard to grasp or construe’ and ‘it is difficult to see why anyone should be inclined to accept it’. Not surprisingly, therefore, some of the most widely read twentieth–century commentators on Aquinas have paid little attention to it. Increased interest has recently been shown in it, but a number of discussions pay insufficient attention to the historical context out of which Thomas's interest in the doctrine emerged, and consequently tend to misconstrue its nature.


2008 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-168 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marilyn McCord Adams

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