Protection of personality rights in the law of delict/torts in Europe: mapping out paradigms

Author(s):  
Gert Brüggemeier
2017 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 273-289
Author(s):  
Anmari Meerkotter

The Constitutional Court (CC) judgment of Lee v Minister of Correction Services 2013 2SA 144 (CC) is a recent contribution to transformative constitutional jurisprudence in the field of the law of delict. This matter turned on the issue of factual causation in the context of wrongful and negligent systemic omissions by the state. In this case note, I explore the law relating to this element of delictual liability with specific regard to the traditional test for factual causation – the conditio sine qua non (‘but-for’) test. In particular, I note the problems occasioned by formalistic adherence to this test in the context of systemic state omissions as evidenced by the SCA judgment in the same matter. I also consider the manner in which English courts have addressed this problem. Thereafter, I analyse the CC’s broader approach to the determination of factual causation as one based on common sense and justice. I argue that this approach endorses a break from a formalistic application of the test and constitutes a step towards an approach which resonates with the foundational constitutional values of freedom, dignity and equality. Furthermore, it presents an appropriate solution to the problems associated with factual causation where systemic omissions are concerned. I then consider the transformative impact of the Lee judgment. In particular, I argue that the broader enquiry favoured by the CC facilitates the realisation of constitutionally guaranteed state accountability, and amounts to an extension of the existing norm of accountability jurisprudence. Hence, I contend that the judgment presents a further effort by the Constitutional Court to effect wholesale the constitutionalisation of the law of delict, as well as a vindicatory tool to be used by litigants who have been adversely affected by systemic state omissions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 253-271
Author(s):  
Emile Zitzke

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.


2018 ◽  
Vol 72 ◽  
pp. 333-347
Author(s):  
Nikodem Rycko
Keyword(s):  
The Law ◽  

Law applicable to the protection of the rights of personality rights is regulated by a method of alternative indication with two equivalent connecting factors. The legislator has not specify who and how should determine which one will apply. Both the linguistic formulation and functional arguments support the conclusion that it is the right of the claimant. In case of lack of such indication the court should apply the law which is most closely connected to the situation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 78 ◽  
pp. 386-401
Author(s):  
Nikodem Rycko

Law applicable to the protection of the rights of personality rights is regulated by a method of alternative indication with two equivalent connecting factors. The interpretation of these criteria – the place of the infringement of personal rights and the place where the damage occurred – may cause difficulties. The interpretation given by the European Court of Justice in the cases of Shevill and eDate Martinez seems to be the first to be taken into account, although exceptions should be admitted in justified cases. If the effects of infringement of the rights of personality occur in the territory of many states, it is to be assumed that the damage existing in each of them is governed by its legal system. However, this mosaic principle should only be applied where the person requesting the protection indicates the applicable law of the place of effect. If the law of the place of the infringement of personal rights is indicated, the norms of one legal system should be applied.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 (2) ◽  
pp. 272-287
Author(s):  
CJ Visser

This article revisits the doctrinal basis of the positive law in protecting the human personality as a legal interest given the approach adopted by the judiciary. In terms of this approach, based on common law and constitutional considerations, the human personality is not articulated as a composite interest (ie the human personality is not doctrinally conceptualised as consisting of various discrete personality rights). Arguably, such an approach denigrates the traditional view that the human personality ought to be protected as a composite interest in law. Therefore, this article interrogates more carefully the doctrinal basis of the law of personality from the perspective of the common law and the Constitution in the light of the controversial nature of the judiciary’s recent approach. In this regard, the article finds that there is an overlap, or more specifically a convergence, between common-law personality rights (as premised on the doctrine of subjective rights and the actio iniuriarum) and fundamental constitutional rights regarding the human personality. The article demonstrates that in terms of scope (ie the various personality interests recognised in positive law) and framework (ie the differentiation and adjudication of the different personality interests in positive law), both the common law and the Constitution attest to the composite nature of the human personality as a legal interest. On this basis, I argue that such convergence enables the creation of a single and integrated doctrinal basis for the post-constitutional operation of the human personality as a legal interest. It is further argued that such a single and integrated doctrinal basis provides the foundation for the further constitutionalisation of the law of personality in terms of a transformative constitutionalism paradigm and the horizontal application of the Constitution.


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