Defending the Empirical: Commonsense Realism and Pragmatic Truth

Author(s):  
Edward Slingerland
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Gilberto Gomes

External negation of conditionals occurs in sentences beginning with ‘It is not true that if’ or similar phrases, and it is not rare in natural language. A conditional may also be denied by another with the same antecedent and opposite consequent. Most often, when the denied conditional is implicative, the denying one is concessive, and vice versa. Here I argue that, in natural language pragmatics, ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ entails ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’, but ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ does not entail ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’. ‘If $A, B$’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ deny each other, but are contraries, not contradictories. Truth conditions that are relevant in human reasoning and discourse often depend not only on semantic but also on pragmatic factors. Examples are provided showing that sentences having the forms ‘$\sim$(if $A, B$)’ and ‘If $A$, $\sim B$’ may have different pragmatic truth conditions. The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle, therefore, does not apply to natural language use of conditionals. Three squares of opposition provide a representation the aforementioned relations.


1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 201-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irene Mikenberg ◽  
Newton C. A. da Costa ◽  
Rolando Chuaqui

There are several conceptions of truth, such as the classical correspondence conception, the coherence conception and the pragmatic conception. The classical correspondence conception, or Aristotelian conception, received a mathematical treatment in the hands of Tarski (cf. Tarski [1935] and [1944]), which was the starting point of a great progress in logic and in mathematics. In effect, Tarski's semantic ideas, especially his semantic characterization of truth, have exerted a major influence on various disciplines, besides logic and mathematics; for instance, linguistics, the philosophy of science, and the theory of knowledge.The importance of the Tarskian investigations derives, among other things, from the fact that they constitute a mathematical, formal mark to serve as a reference for the philosophical (informal) conceptions of truth. Today the philosopher knows that the classical conception can be developed and that it is free from paradoxes and other difficulties, if certain precautions are taken.We believe that is not an exaggeration if we assert that Tarski's theory should be considered as one of the greatest accomplishments of logic and mathematics of our time, an accomplishment which is also of extraordinary relevance to philosophy, as we have already remarked.In this paper we show that the pragmatic conception of truth, at least in one of its possible interpretations, has also a mathematical formulation, similar in spirit to that given by Tarski to the classical correspondence conception.


1998 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 603-620 ◽  
Author(s):  
Newton C. A. da Costa ◽  
Otávio Bueno ◽  
Steven French
Keyword(s):  

2014 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marek Tamm

This article aims to suggest one possible – pragmatist in a very broad sense of the term – approach to making sense of the way truth and objectivity function within the discipline of history. It argues that history doesn’t need a new theory of truth; rather, it is necessary to analyse in theoretical terms how truth is understood and used in historical inquiry. This article considers truth as an epistemic term in a certain given – historiographical – use, and objectivity is understood as an epistemic virtue valued in a specific contemporary scientific community, that of professional historians. The main argument is developed in three interrelated steps. First, the article makes the case for a pragmatic “truth pact” in history writing, arguing that the conditions of historical truth depend on the illocutionary force of historical utterance. Second, it proposes that this “truth pact” is “guaranteed” by fellow historians or, in other words: truth claims in history writing are based not on their direct relation with reality but on a disciplinary consensus as to the methods of inquiry, cognitive values and epistemic virtues. Third, it will establish a clear connection between truth and proof in history writing, arguing that the “truth pact” is grounded in a critical analysis of the available evidence.


2019 ◽  
pp. 19-20
Author(s):  
Richard Bennett ◽  
Joseph E. Oliver
Keyword(s):  

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