Incomplete Information on Two Sides

2015 ◽  
pp. 326-391
Author(s):  
Jean-Francois Mertens ◽  
Sylvain Sorin ◽  
Shmuel Zamir
Author(s):  
Galina Artemenko ◽  
Dmitry Artemenko

Tax authorities often have to make decisions under conditions of incomplete information about the actual situation. The incompleteness and uncertainty of information may arise from the actions of the two sides with distinct interests. One side is the tax authority (local, regional, or national level), and the other is the taxpayers (organizations or individuals). This largely explains the interest of tax authorities in the creation of software capable of providing quantitative and qualitative analysis of the declarations submitted by taxpayers to identify suspicious declarations for their additional inspection. The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a comparative pre-forecast analysis of the time series enterprise performance indicators and time series of its tax payments.


2015 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 678-679

Martin W. Cripps of University College London reviews “Repeated Games”, by Jean-Francois Mertens, Sylvain Sorin, and Shmuel Zamir. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Presents the content of the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (Université Catholique de Louvain) discussion papers 9420, 9421, and 9422 and published as Repeated Games in 1994. Discusses basic results on normal form games; basic results on extensive form games; the belief space; a general model of repeated games; full information on one side; incomplete information on two sides; stochastic games; extensions and further results; and non-zero-sum games with incomplete information. Includes an additional appendix discussing further developments.” The late Mertens was a Professor at the Université Catholique de Louvain. Sorin is with the Mathematics Department at the Université Pierre et Marie Curie. Zamir is Professor Emeritus and a founding member of the Center for the Study of Rationality at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Professor of Economics at the University of Exeter Business School.


Author(s):  
C. Goessens ◽  
D. Schryvers ◽  
J. Van Landuyt ◽  
A. Verbeeck ◽  
R. De Keyzer

Silver halide grains (AgX, X=Cl,Br,I) are commonly recognized as important entities in photographic applications. Depending on the preparation specifications one can grow cubic, octahedral, tabular a.o. morphologies, each with its own physical and chemical characteristics. In the present study crystallographic defects introduced by the mixing of 5-20% iodide in a growing AgBr tabular grain are investigated. X-ray diffractometry reveals the existence of a homogeneous Ag(Br1-xIx) region, expected to be formed around the AgBr kernel. In fig. 1 a two-beam BF image, taken at T≈100 K to diminish radiation damage, of a triangular tabular grain is presented, clearly showing defect contrast fringes along four of the six directions; the remaining two sides show similar contrast under relevant diffraction conditions. The width of the central defect free region corresponds with the pure AgBr kernel grown before the mixing with I. The thickness of a given grain lies between 0.15 and 0.3 μm: as indicated in fig. 2 triangular (resp. hexagonal) grains exhibit an uneven (resp. even) number of twin interfaces (i.e., between + and - twin variants) parallel with the (111) surfaces. The thickness of the grains and the existence of the twin variants was confirmed from CTEM images of perpendicular cuts.


2004 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 181-184
Author(s):  
Amy Garrigues

On September 15, 2003, the US. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that agreements between pharmaceutical and generic companies not to compete are not per se unlawful if these agreements do not expand the existing exclusionary right of a patent. The Valley DrugCo.v.Geneva Pharmaceuticals decision emphasizes that the nature of a patent gives the patent holder exclusive rights, and if an agreement merely confirms that exclusivity, then it is not per se unlawful. With this holding, the appeals court reversed the decision of the trial court, which held that agreements under which competitors are paid to stay out of the market are per se violations of the antitrust laws. An examination of the Valley Drugtrial and appeals court decisions sheds light on the two sides of an emerging legal debate concerning the validity of pay-not-to-compete agreements, and more broadly, on the appropriate balance between the seemingly competing interests of patent and antitrust laws.


Author(s):  
Ángel Correa ◽  
Paola Cappucci ◽  
Anna C. Nobre ◽  
Juan Lupiáñez

Would it be helpful to inform a driver about when a conflicting traffic situation is going to occur? We tested whether temporal orienting of attention could enhance executive control to select among conflicting stimuli and responses. Temporal orienting was induced by presenting explicit cues predicting the most probable interval for target onset, which could be short (400 ms) or long (1,300 ms). Executive control was measured both by flanker and Simon tasks involving conflict between incompatible responses and by the spatial Stroop task involving conflict between perceptual stimulus features. The results showed that temporal orienting facilitated the resolution of perceptual conflict by reducing the spatial Stroop effect, whereas it interfered with the resolution of response conflict by increasing flanker and Simon effects. Such opposite effects suggest that temporal orienting of attention modulates executive control through dissociable mechanisms, depending on whether the competition between conflicting representations is located at perceptual or response levels.


2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Leman ◽  
Matthew S. Matell ◽  
Michael Brown

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie A. Quezada ◽  
Isabel J. Gonzalez ◽  
Michael A. Zarate

2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 134-161
Author(s):  
Christine N. Winston ◽  
Hemali Maher ◽  
Veena Easvaradoss
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-570
Author(s):  
S. Ram Kumar
Keyword(s):  

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