A STATISTICAL APPROACH TO EPISTEMIC DEMOCRACY
Keyword(s):
AbstractWe briefly review Condorcet's and Young's epistemic interpretations of preference aggregation rules as maximum likelihood estimators. We then develop a general framework for interpreting epistemic social choice rules as maximum likelihood estimators, maximum a posteriori estimators, or expected utility maximizers. We illustrate this framework with several examples. Finally, we critique this program.
1974 ◽
Vol 3
(10)
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pp. 969-977
2018 ◽
pp. 397
2011 ◽
Vol 81
(4)
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pp. 529-537
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2020 ◽
Vol 72
(2)
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pp. 89-110
2013 ◽
Vol 70
(3)
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pp. 279-312