NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: MEASURING NORMATIVE DISPOSITION

2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Dukalskis
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
South Korea ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Northeast Asia ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Measurement Tool ◽  
Northeast Asian ◽  
Japan And China

ABSTRACTThis article aims to understand the policies of three major Northeast Asian states toward the Rome Statute and the International Criminal Court (ICC) that it established. Using a unique measurement tool, it traces the interactions of South Korea, Japan, and China with the Court since negotiations on its formation in the late 1990s. Included in this analysis is a focus on how Northeast Asian states have responded to recent efforts to bring North Korea into the Court's orbit for that country's military actions in 2010 and its human rights record over several decades. Data is based on publicly available documents as well as interviews with diplomats, legislators, legal experts, and activists in Japan, South Korea, and China conducted in 2015.

Part 10 Enforcement: Exécution, Art.106 Supervision of enforcement of sentences and conditions of imprisonment/Contrôle de l’exécution de la peine et conditions de détention

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Schabas William A
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
The State ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
International Standards ◽  
National Treatment ◽  
Receive Treatment

This chapter comments on Article 106 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Article 106 strikes a balance between the general carceral system applicable in the State of enforcement that applies to the Court's prisoner, and the requirement of generally accepted international standards drawn from human rights instruments. This ‘national treatment’ clause was originally introduced to ensure that prisoners of the Court would not receive treatment that was worse than that of ordinary prisoners. The primary function of the provision is protecting the fundamental rights of the prisoner. The article also declares that Communications between a sentenced person and the Court shall be unimpeded and confidential.

In the Shadow of the International Criminal Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
pp. 3-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Appel
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Strong Support ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Crimes Against Humanity ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Human Rights Abuses ◽  
Expected Payoffs

The International Criminal Court (ICC) is responsible for prosecuting crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. Despite the potential for the ICC to deter human rights abuses, scholars and policy makers are divided on the effectiveness of it. This debate, however, is plagued by some important theoretical and empirical limitations. I address the problems in the literature and evaluate whether the ICC can prevent human rights abuses. I argue that the ICC can deter governments from committing human rights violations by imposing a variety of costs on them throughout their investigations that decrease their expected payoffs for engaging in human rights abuses. Across a variety of statistical estimators that account for standard threats to inference and several anecdotes, I find strong support for my theoretical expectations; leaders from states that have ratified the Rome Statute commit lower levels of human rights abuses than nonratifier leaders.

‘INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED HUMAN RIGHTS’ BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT

2011 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 189-208 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Young
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Applicable Law ◽  
Treaty Interpretation

Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)1provides that the International Criminal Court must consider ‘internationally recognized human rights’ in its interpretation and application of applicable law. This article highlights the difficulty of meaningfully interpreting this reference to ‘internationally recognized human rights’ in accordance with the ordinary rules of treaty interpretation. These interpretative difficulties lead the article to adopt a practical focus, examining the initial jurisprudence of the Court utilizing this aspect of article 21(3), concluding that although such jurisprudence reveals a number of shortcomings, the provision's tremendous potential as a tool of evolution and innovation is evident.

scholarly journals The other side of the Article 21(3) coin: Human rights in the Rome Statute and the limits of Article 21(3)

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 837-850
Author(s):  
Emma Irving
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Central Place ◽  
Legal Framework ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
The Past

AbstractThe drafters of the Rome Statute sought to accord human rights a central place within the legal framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC). This was done not only through numerous provisions on the rights of the accused, victims, and witnesses, but also through the inclusion of the overarching Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Article 21(3) Rome Statute requires that the interpretation and application of all ICC law be consistent with internationally recognized human rights. While this provision has been employed on numerous occasions to bolster human rights protection in the ICC legal framework, it is not without its limits. In a series of decisions over the past few years, ICC judges have placed limits on the protections that can be read into the ICC legal framework on the basis of Article 21(3). Beyond stating that the ICC ‘is not a human rights court’, the decisions in question articulate no clear justification for the limitations imposed on Article 21(3). The present article analyses these decisions and identifies the underlying rationale for the Court’s approach: the principle of speciality. However, the picture is further complicated by the judges’ willingness to overlook the principle of speciality when particularly serious violations of human rights are involved. This leaves the precise contours of human rights protection in the ICC legal framework undefined.

Human Rights Protection before the International Criminal Court

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 72-101
Author(s):  
Alex Davidson
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
International Criminal Court ◽  
Rome Statute ◽  
International Criminal ◽  
Criminal Court ◽  
Successful Operation ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Interpretative Analysis

This article assesses the human rights framework of those accused before the International Criminal Court, with particular emphasis on Article 21(3) of the Rome Statute. Part 2 examines a number of obstacles currently impinging the successful operation of human rights protection before the Court, which Article 21(3) may remedy. Part 3, drawing on strands of interpretative analysis, seeks to interpret and illuminate Article 21(3), arguing that a broad scope ought to be adopted for determining the substantive content encapsulated by ‘internationally recognized human rights’. Moreover, Article 21(3) should be recognised as containing the hierarchical standard of what has been termed ‘super-legality’. Part 4 then highlights the interpretive potential for Article 21(3) as both a tool of innovation and as a remedial device for human rights violations before the Court that are not explicitly provided for in the Rome Statute.

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