scholarly journals Can Employment Reduce Lawlessness and Rebellion? A Field Experiment with High-Risk Men in a Fragile State

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER BLATTMAN ◽  
JEANNIE ANNAN

States and aid agencies use employment programs to rehabilitate high-risk men in the belief that peaceful work opportunities will deter them from crime and violence. Rigorous evidence is rare. We experimentally evaluate a program of agricultural training, capital inputs, and counseling for Liberian ex-fighters who were illegally mining or occupying rubber plantations. Fourteen months after the program ended, men who accepted the program offer increased their farm employment and profits, and shifted work hours away from illicit activities. Men also reduced interest in mercenary work in a nearby war. Finally, some men did not receive their capital inputs but expected a future cash transfer instead, and they reduced illicit and mercenary activities most of all. The evidence suggests that illicit and mercenary labor supply responds to small changes in returns to peaceful work, especially future and ongoing incentives. But the impacts of training alone, without capital, appear to be low.

Author(s):  
Christopher Blattman ◽  
Richard Peck ◽  
Patryk Perkowski ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Shammi Quddus

Author(s):  
Christopher Blattman ◽  
Richard Peck ◽  
Patryk Perkowski ◽  
Keesler Welch ◽  
Shammi Quddus

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica Goldberg

I use a field experiment to estimate the wage elasticity of employment in the day labor market in rural Malawi. Once a week for 12 consecutive weeks, I make job offers for a workfare-type program to 529 adults. The daily wage varies from the tenth to the ninetieth percentile of the wage distribution, and individuals are entitled to work a maximum of one day per week. In this context (the low agricultural season), 74 percent of individuals worked at the lowest wage, and consequently the estimated labor supply elasticity is low (0.15), regardless of observable characteristics. (JEL C93, J22, J31, O15, O18, R23)


Author(s):  
Yufeng Li ◽  
Juanjuan Meng ◽  
Changcheng Song ◽  
Kai Zheng

Will individuals, especially high-risk individuals, avoid a disease test because of information avoidance? We conduct a field experiment to investigate this issue. We vary the price of a diabetes test (price experiment) and offer both a diabetes test and a cancer test (disease experiment) after eliciting participants’ subjective beliefs about their disease risk. We find evidence that, first, some people avoid the test even when there is neither a monetary nor a transaction cost, and second, both low- and high-risk individuals select out of the test as the price increases. We explain our findings using three classes of models of anticipatory utility. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.


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