Off the Record: Unrecorded Legislative Votes, Selection Bias and Roll-Call Vote Analysis

2006 ◽  
Vol 36 (4) ◽  
pp. 691-704 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD J. CARRUBBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
LACEY MURRAH ◽  
RYAN CLOUGH ◽  
ELIZABETH MONTGOMERY ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Random Sample ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
General Study ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Sampling Problem ◽  
The Universe

Scholars often use roll-call votes to study legislative behaviour. However, many legislatures only conclude a minority of decisions by roll call. Thus, if these votes are not a random sample of the universe of votes cast, scholars may be drawing misleading inferences. In fact, theories over why roll-call votes are requested would predict selection bias based on exactly the characteristics of legislative voting that scholars have most heavily studied. This article demonstrates the character and severity of this sampling problem empirically by examining European Parliament vote data for a whole year. Given that many legislatures decided only a fraction of their legislation by roll call, these findings have potentially important implications for the general study of legislative behaviour.

Tracing the selection bias in roll call votes: party group cohesion in the European Parliament

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 373-399 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikoleta Yordanova ◽  
Monika Mühlböck
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
Group Cohesion ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Legislative Politics ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Rule Change ◽  
Before And After ◽  
Strategic Motives ◽  
Party Group

Legislative politics scholars rely heavily on roll call vote (RCV) data. However, it has been claimed that strategic motives behind RCV requests lead to overestimating party group cohesion and, thus, biased findings on legislative behaviour. To explore this claim, we distinguish between two types of bias, a ‘behavioural bias’ and a ‘selection bias’. A recent rule change in the European Parliament, making RCVs mandatory on all final legislative votes, presents the unique opportunity to evaluate the latter. We compare party group cohesion in requested and mandatory RCVs by examining final legislative votes before and after the rule adoption using amendment RCVs (which still need to be requested) as a benchmark. The analysis shows that group cohesion is higher whenever RCVs are not just requested on some but mandatory on all votes. Hence, there is indeed a ‘selection bias’ in RCV data. Yet, somewhat contrary to former claims, relying on requested RCVs leads to underestimation of the cohesion party groups would have had were all votes automatically roll called. We argue that this is mainly because requests occur on more contentious votes.

scholarly journals Is there a selection bias in roll call votes? Evidence from the European Parliament

Public Choice ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 176 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 211-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Hix ◽  
Abdul Noury ◽  
Gerard Roland
Keyword(s):  
Selection Bias ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Roll Call

Legislative Voting Behavior, Seen and Unseen: A Theory of Roll-Call Vote Selection

2008 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 543-572 ◽  
Author(s):  
CLIFFORD CARRUBBA ◽  
MATTHEW GABEL ◽  
SIMON HUG
Keyword(s):  
Voting Behavior ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Legislative Voting

scholarly journals Analysis of political orientation and left-right party labelling in the European Parliament

Dela ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 103-127
Author(s):  
Miha Nahtigal
Keyword(s):  
Political Parties ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Political Orientation ◽  
The Political ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Party Positions ◽  
Liberal Position

This article explores the political parties in the 8th European Parliament on the basis of roll-call vote analysis. Besides the left-right divisions, we have also analysed the nationalist-globalist political cleavage. We have compared the resulting party positions with their left-right wing party labels. In addition, we have focused on inconsistencies and biased existing labels and the geopolitical interests connected with the current way of labelling. We have found out that the current way of left-right labelling privileges a globalist and liberal position, while some other political positions were not even represented. Finally, we have presented a new way of political labelling, which would also include a nationalist-globalist cleavage.

scholarly journals Candidacy Eligibility Criteria and Party Unity

2020 ◽  
Vol 53 (8) ◽  
pp. 1298-1325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jochen Rehmert
Keyword(s):  
Original Data ◽  
Candidate Selection ◽  
Roll Call ◽  
Selection Methods ◽  
Roll Call Vote ◽  
Eligibility Criteria ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Legislative Voting ◽  
Industrial Democracies ◽  
Formal Requirements

Extant research suggests that candidate selection methods can be consequential for party unity in legislative voting. Yet thus far, only variations in the selectorate and the degree of centralization have been examined. This article argues that Candidacy Eligibility Criteria (CEC), too, have implications for party unity. I theorize that with stricter formal requirements, parties avoid adverse selection and ensure the nomination of committed candidates. By using roll-call vote data from 16 industrial democracies, candidate surveys and an original data set consisting of nearly 500 historical party constitutions, I show that parties demanding prior membership and nudging aspirants to maintain networks within the party tend to be more unified in parliamentary voting. Moreover, their candidates, too, express greater loyalty when compared with parties without formal CEC. Thus, this article contributes to the literatures on party unity and on candidate selection by showing how certain party rules, hitherto neglected, affect party unity.

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