On Qualification of the Phenomenon of Hybridism of the Use of Force and the Problem of Interference in Internal Affairs of a State

The purpose of this article is to eliminate methodological discrepancies in the definition of the problem of “hybrid” use of force and the possibility of using this construct when interfering in the internal affairs of states. In any conflict situation, the behavior of states in moving towards their national goals can be explained through how they do combine and synchronize (as it is often defined at the present time — «hybrid») the use of means of compellence and coercion available to them. In general, conceptually «hybrid war» can be described as “the synchronized use of multiple instruments of national power, specially selected to obtain mutually reinforcing effects on specific vulnerabilities across the entire spectrum of social processes. The substance of the modern security environment has led to an increase in the number of areas of conflict of interests of actors, the complexity and dynamism of conflicts, and the unpredictability of their outcomes. The formation of the practice of attribution of international responsibility, and the development of the international institutions supporting it, took place gradually and, ultimately, led to such a development of the international security environment, which made an appeal to «hybridity» to promote national interests in the process of political competition of social groups or individuals with divergent interests for power inevitable. The problem of terminology is one of the main obstacles to a clear understanding of the operation of the «hybridity» construct in political competition. The active use of the definition «hybrid» by propaganda in combination with the terms «war», «threats», «hostilities in the gray zone», «operations», «tactics», «competition does not turn into a state of war» political discourse, since these terms are almost never linked to the definition of the desired state of international relations by the state leadership. And if we are talking about the outcome of the collision of interests of actors in competition or conflict, then this desired result is «historically» defined by the term «victory». Thus, the definition of the substance of «victory» is a necessary initial point to onset analyzing the possibilities of turning to any of the instruments of national power in a «hybrid» confrontation.

PARTAI DEMOKRASI INDONESIA PERJUANGAN DALAM PERSAINGAN POLITIK DI BALI TAHUN 1999-2019

ABSTRACK This study seeks to reveal the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) in the political competition in Bali in 1999-2019. The change in the power system from the New Order to the Reformation has resulted in significant changes in the political system. At the local political level in Bali there is a shift in political power. Previously, during the New Order era, political power was controlled by Golkar, now it has begun to shift to the PDI-P. The problems discussed in this study are (1) how was the PDI-P's role in political competition in Bali from 1999-2019 (2) Why PDI-P managed to emerge as a competitor in political competition in Bali (3) What was the competition from the success of the PDI -P emerged as the dominant party in Bali. This study uses historical theory, especially historical explanations and historical cause and effect as well as theoretical assistance from social science, namely Leadership from Antonio Gramsci. The results show that throughout the post-New Order election, PDI-P managed to emerge as the dominant party in Bali from 1999-2019. The success of the PDI-P to emerge as the dominant party in Bali is inseparable from the success of the PDI-P in utilizing the symbolic capital of the past as Soekarno's party, the PDI-P has also succeeded in building a system of alliances with various community groups that provide political support, and the PDI-P has succeeded in reforming the system. party organization. this had implications for the success of the PDI-P in realizing the party's agenda. Keywords: PDI-P, Election, Political Competition, Domination

Features of the Implementation of Decommunization Policy of the Symbolic Space in Local Macrocommunities of Ukraine

The article analyzes the practices of local self-government in Ukraine in the field of decommunization of urban spaces in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Dnieper. The peculiarities of the implementation of the policy of de-communization of the symbolic space indicate that since 2015, at the level of local macrocommunities, they have become public arenas of interpretations of the past. Their memorial symbolic structure reflects the competition between political actors representing competing commemorative orders. Local self-government practices have acquired their expressive specificity in each of the local macrocommunities. In particular, in Kiev, the policy of local self-government bodies is designated by us as “political”, which is associated with its status as the capital of Ukraine. It was this status that subordinated the symbolic space of local history and the retrospective reverse to historical names. Local authorities in Odessa and Kharkov carried out decommunization with the involvement, in addition to the political, pragmatic (Kharkov) and historical (Odessa) practices of renaming toponyms. Historical practice has become the core of the practice of decommunization of the symbolic space of the Dnieper. At the same time, local governments in all four cities of Ukraine were subjects of political competition (“symbolic struggle”) for the right to form and approve the idea of the legitimate order of the city's symbolic space. By referring to Ukraine's policy in the field of decommunization as one that has elements of symbolic violence, local governments fueled the social tension that accompanied the implementation of this policy.

PRECONDITIONS AND COURSE OF THE MOLDAVIAN CAMPAIGN OF SULEIMAN KANUNI IN 1538 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BORDER POSITION OF BUKOVYNA

The territory in Upper Suceava, Siret, Upper Popruttia and Middle Podnistrovya (Bukovyna) played an important part in international relations due to transcontinental trade routes connecting the north of Western Europe and the Black Sea. Moreover, it was a confluence of political and economic interests of current major countries of Central and Eastern Europe, mostly Poland and later Ottoman Empire which had been competing for the hegemony in the region and craved to be decisive in its history. During 1530, the Ottoman Empire and Poland wanted to extend their power to Moldavia and to Bukovina. The reason for this was that the region was at the forefront of the struggle between both countries. Frontier conflicts between Poland and Moldavia lasted until 1538 when Turkish sultan and Polish king arranged Tartar Horde to capture Moldavian lands and Polish troops which surrounded Khotyn fortress forced Petru Rares make a vassal oath to Zygmunt I. Still it did not help preserve Moldavian sovereignty as Turkish sultan occupied Suceava due to Moldavian boyars betrayal, while Petru Rares was compelled to escape to Transylvania. Thus, Moldavia and the territory of Bukovyna went over to Ottoman Empire, which had negative consequences on the situation of the local people, restricting its agricultural and demographic development. The borders of Bukovyna became, therefore, the borders of Ottoman Empire. Besides, eastern part of Bukovyna (with the centre in Khotyn) was subordinate to Turkish administration which created an important defense point that often became the location for battles in coming years. Thus, after the Moldavian state became dependent on the Ottoman state in 1538, the situation in Bukovynian lands deteriorated significantly. The consequence of this was that from the end of the XVI – the beginning of the XVII century Bukovyna was the object of military-political competition, and power over the region passed from hand to hand.

Clientelism and development: Vote-buying meets patronage

Offering employment in the public sector in exchange for electoral support (patronage politics) and vote-buying are clientelistic practices frequently used by political machines. In the literature, these practices are typically studied in isolation. In this paper, we study how the interaction between these two practices (as opposed to having just one tool) affects economic development. We present a theoretical model of political competition, where, before the election, the incumbent chooses the level of state investment that can improve productivity in the private sector. This decision affects the income levels of employees in the private sector, and, thereby, the costs and effectiveness of vote-buying and patronage. We show that when the politician can use both clientelistic instruments simultaneously, his opportunity cost for clientelism in terms of foregone future taxes declines. As a result, the equilibrium amount of public investment is typically lower when both tools are available than otherwise.

Algorithmic Opportunity Structures and the Dynamics of Online Activism: Far-Right Mobilization on Facebook

This paper introduces the concept of algorithmic opportunity structures to explore how the efficacy of online activism is contingent on the interaction between algorithms, activists, and audiences. In particular, I examine how far-right actors have gamed ranking and recommendation algorithms by producing content designed to generate high engagement rates. This tactic attracts algorithmic amplification, increasing their visibility and reach on social media. I consider the case of Britain First, a far-right, anti-Muslim movement that used Facebook to rapidly build the largest audience of any political organization in the United Kingdom. I use digital trace data, time series analysis, and topic modeling to study Britain First’s activity, recruitment, and support on Facebook. I identify dynamic equilibria indicative of algorithmically-mediated feedback loops, highlighting how variation in these processes is largely a function of user engagement. The content of the group’s posts and exogenous events, including elections and terrorist attacks, are also associated with short-term fluctuations in online mobilization. The results suggest that Britain First’s success is attributable to its exploitation of Facebook’s algorithms, demonstrating how technological assemblages designed and controlled by corporations can structure political competition and moderate opportunities for activism.

The dependence of election coverage on political institutions: Political competition and policy framing in Germany and the United Kingdom

Election coverage is often assumed to be different to everyday political coverage. We argue that this depends on political institutions. In majoritarian countries, where elections choose governments, election coverage should decisively move towards political competition and away from policy. In consensual countries, where coalitions are based on policy negotiations, there should be a less pronounced shift towards political competition and away from policy. To test this argument, we use an automatic coding system to study 0.9 billion words in Die Welt for 12 years and in the Financial Times for 30 years. The results support our institutional hypothesis.

Role of Institutional Environment in Shaping Political Careers of Young Political Leaders in the Regions of South-West Siberia

Evaluating prospects of bringing youth into Russian political elites has both an acuteness of a scientific challenge and practical relevance in the light of upcoming federal and regional elections of 2021. Based on the surveys of mass political consciousness of the youth and expert polls held in 2018-2020 in Altai Krai and Novosibirsk Oblast, the article has analyzed the visions of young people and their leaders on the effectiveness of career development through participation in youth political organizations, political parties and running for posts in election campaigns. Having measured these visions against the proportion of young people in the elite of the regional offices of political parties and in the lists of candidates running in regional elections, the authors have come to the conclusion about the low acceptance rate of career lift in regional political process. The object of the research comprises regions with different level of social and economic development, which has proved that lack of resource hinders realization of young leaders potential primarily in the regions with high concentration of economic capital and strong political competition.

Eurasianism and geopolitics: Social mythologemes of space

The article considers the origins of Eurasianism as a Russian social doctrine that emerged as an answer to the Western geopolitical concepts, in particular of the Anglo-Saxon and German geopolitical schools. Both concepts serve to justify social institutions and associations based on the difference between the spaces of the Eastern and Western parts of Eurasia. The authors argue that geopolitics of both the Western-European and Eastern-European types is based on mythologemes which claim to be of scientific importance but are not capable of achieving this status. The article shows that both theories claim (1) the invention of an ideal timeless homeland of society on the basis of a mythological interpretation of space; (2) possession of sacred knowledge (through the sacralization of space) which is actually profane. The key difference between Western geopolitical schools (Anglo-Saxon and German) and Eurasianism is the proposed connection between space and a specific society. Geopolitics proceeds from the constant spatial opposition as a factor of social-political competition. The geopolitical assessment of reality is based on the need to attack the alien space due to its initial, natural hostility. The geopolitical hostility and even aggressiveness contradicts the defensive nature of Eurasianism which declares that space unites peoples with similar values; therefore, their societies should defend their space of development from the encroachments of the Western countries. Thus, Atlanticism as a global project of the contemporary Western geopolitics fundamentally contradicts Eurasianism which does not accept hegemonism and supports the principle of a multipolar world; today, the level of conflict between these projects is not high, although there are no prospects for this conflict resolution.