Public assembly: the new highway code

1999 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-293
Author(s):  
Ivan Hare
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Public Order ◽  
First Case ◽  
House Of Lords

THE Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, which attracted so much controversy during its passage, continued to provoke dissent in the first case to reach the House of Lords on the interpretation of its public order provisions. The question in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Jones [1999] 2 W.L.R. 625 was the extent of the public's right to use the highway and, more specifically, whether a public assembly may constitute a lawful user.

scholarly journals TRANCE-GRESSION: TECHNOSHAMANISM, CONSERVATISM AND PAGAN POLITICS

2010 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 201-220
Author(s):  
David Green
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Environmental Politics ◽  
The Political ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Moral Panics ◽  
Especial Reference ◽  
Conservative Government ◽  
Rave Culture ◽  
Spiritual Freedom

This article looks at the politics of successive Conservative governments in Britain in the 1980s and ‘90s through the lens of the increasing politicisation of Paganisms in that period. A wave of moral panics in the late ‘80’s and early ‘90s concerning marginal communities – such as Ravers, New Age travellers and anti-road protesters – and their ‘riotous assemblies’, culminated in the Conservative Government of John Major enacting The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994. This was seen by these communities as legislation against alternative lifestyles and, in some respects, an infringement of spiritual freedom. Using the case study of technoshamanism – a Pagan meeting of ‘rave’ culture and neo-shamanism – I wish to examine how the political and Pagan religious landscapes of ‘80s and ‘90s Britain intersected and led to politically engaged forms of Pagan practice often centred around grassroots lifestyle and environmental politics. This will be explored with especial reference to the politicisation of The Spiral Tribe, a technoshamanic collective of the early ‘90s, and their increasing involvement in resisting the 1994 Act and promotion of campaigns such as Reclaim the Streets.

as illegally obtained evidence is not, ipso facto, automatically rendered inadmissible. The House of Lords ruled in Sang that no discretion existed to exclude evidence simply because it had been illegally or improperly obtained. A court could only exclude relevant evidence where its effect would be 'unduly prejudicial'. This is reflected in s 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) 1984 (below). This perhaps surprising rule was supported by the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice (although the argument there w as chiefly focused on the admissibility of confession evidence). An action for damages for false imprisonment. In some cases the damages for such an action would be likely to be nominal if the violation by the detainer does not have much impact on the detainee. Consider cases under this heading like Christie v Leachinsky. Damages can, however, be considerable. Apart from the question of civil remedies, it is important to remember that, if the arrest is not lawful, there is the right to use reasonable force to resist it. This is a remedy, however, of doubtful advisability as the legality of the arrest will only be properly tested after the event in a law court. If a police officer was engaged in what the courts decide was a lawful arrest or conduct, then anyone who uses force against the officer might have been guilty of an offence of assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty contrary to s of the Police Act 1964. Police Act Section Assaults on constables

2012 ◽  
pp. 358-358
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Police Officer ◽  
Royal Commission ◽  
Relevant Evidence ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Civil Remedies ◽  
Confession Evidence ◽  
The Right ◽  
False Imprisonment

Competing Models for Approaching Violence and Conflict and their Points of Contact

2021 ◽  
pp. 26-64
Author(s):  
Lidia Luisa Zanetti Domingues
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Social Harmony ◽  
Order Model ◽  
Late Medieval ◽  
Social Actors ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competing Models

In the first chapter, the three models of approaching crime and violence that coexisted in late medieval Siena (the culture of revenge model, the public order model, and the penitential model) are described, and differences and similarities between them are analysed. The commonality of the language used by different social actors to talk about violence, criminal justice, and social harmony is identified as something that promoted exchanges between models. However, the chapter also highlights that, although models overlapped and the lay government tended to borrow concepts and ideas from penitential elaborations in order to promote ideas of peace and public order, the ultimate goals and visions that different social actors had were and remained different.

19. Character Evidence and the Accused as a Witness at Trial

2021 ◽  
pp. 361-387
Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Public Order ◽  
Character Evidence

This chapter examines the evidential rules that apply to the defendant at trial. These include the defendant’s competence and compellability; the course of the defendant’s evidence; drawing an adverse inference under s. 35 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 from the defendant’s silence at trial; the admissibility of a defendant’s past bad character; admissibility of defendant’s good character; and arguments for and against the defendant giving evidence.

afterwards, the company's chairman agreed to the company being taken over by another company. The merchant bankers informed the appellant of the proposed take-over and told him that a public announcement would be made shortly but that until then the information was sensitive and highly confidential. The appellant promptly purchased 6,000 shares in the company and, following the announcement of the take over, made a substantial profit. He was charged with two offences of dealing in the securities of a company as a prohibited person, contrary to s1(3) and (4)(a) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (subsequently replaced by Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt V). The trial judge directed the jury to acquit the appellant on the ground that there was no evidence that he had 'obtained' the information, for the purposes of s1(3), since it had been given to him unsolicited. The Attorney General then referred to the Court of Appeal for its opinion the question of the meaning of 'obtained' in s1(3) of the 1985 Act. The Court of Appeal held that a person obtained information for the purposes of s1(3) and (4)(a) of the 1985 Act, even if he came by it without any positive action on his part. On the appellant's application the Court of Appeal referred the point to the House of Lords. where-(a)

2012 ◽  
pp. 185-188
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Public Announcement ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Insider Dealing ◽  
A Company ◽  
Court Of Appeal
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