afterwards, the company's chairman agreed to the company being taken over by another company. The merchant bankers informed the appellant of the proposed take-over and told him that a public announcement would be made shortly but that until then the information was sensitive and highly confidential. The appellant promptly purchased 6,000 shares in the company and, following the announcement of the take over, made a substantial profit. He was charged with two offences of dealing in the securities of a company as a prohibited person, contrary to s1(3) and (4)(a) of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (subsequently replaced by Criminal Justice Act 1993, Pt V). The trial judge directed the jury to acquit the appellant on the ground that there was no evidence that he had 'obtained' the information, for the purposes of s1(3), since it had been given to him unsolicited. The Attorney General then referred to the Court of Appeal for its opinion the question of the meaning of 'obtained' in s1(3) of the 1985 Act. The Court of Appeal held that a person obtained information for the purposes of s1(3) and (4)(a) of the 1985 Act, even if he came by it without any positive action on his part. On the appellant's application the Court of Appeal referred the point to the House of Lords. where-(a)

2012 ◽  
pp. 185-188
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Public Announcement ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
Insider Dealing ◽  
A Company ◽  
Court Of Appeal

THEFT OR SHARP PRACTICE: WHO CARES NOW?

2001 ◽  
Vol 60 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-58
Author(s):  
A.T.H. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Civil Law ◽  
Positive Answer ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Gift ◽  
Court Of Appeal

THE House of Lords has upheld, by a majority, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hinks [2000] 3 W.L.R. 1590 (noted (1999) 58 C.L.J. 10), giving a positive answer to the certified question: “Whether the acquisition of an indefeasible title to property is capable of amounting to an appropriation of property belonging to another for the purposes of section 1(1) of the Theft Act 1968”. The appellant had persuaded a somewhat simple-minded man to make her the “gift” of a quite considerable sum of money. No deception was alleged to have been employed, and so far as the civil law was concerned, the “gift” might well have been a perfectly valid transaction; the question was never determined by the jury, because it was deemed to be irrelevant by the trial judge. But the decision of the House of Lords is to the effect that she was properly convicted of theft however that question might have been answered. So, it would seem, a person may become the indefeasible owner of property and nevertheless be accounted a thief of that very same property, and by the very act of acquiring the ownership of it.

scholarly journals Case management in complex fraud trials: actors and strategies in achieving procedural efficiency

2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 336-355
Author(s):  
Aleksandra Jordanoska
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Case Management ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Qualitative Data ◽  
Procedural Fairness ◽  
Successful Management ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Public Resources ◽  
Insider Dealing

AbstractTrials of complex fraud cases have raised numerous contentious issues in terms of procedural fairness and public resources expenditure. This paper examines the management of complex fraud trials through the lens of managerialism in the criminal justice system, analysing its effects upon procedural efficiency of the trial. The paper draws on qualitative data gathered from observations of insider-dealing trials, and interviews with prosecuting and defence lawyers and a trial judge. The findings reveal that, in practice, although dangers to procedural efficiency are constantly present throughout the trial, its successful management depends on a combination of factors vested in the actors involved and the strategies used. Whilst the increased efficiency of the trials is a reflection of managerial approaches in case management, this does not necessarily indicate a negative development in the area of the control of business misconduct, and managerialism may not be necessarily entirely undesirable in the criminal justice system.

eventually agreed after the husband had applied pressure. A 20 year mortgage with the plaintiffs was arranged for a sum of £150,000, the stated purpose being to pay off the existing mortgage and to buy a holiday home. Documents relating to the mortgage were prepared, which the wife signed without reading them. At no stage was she advised of the content of the documents, nor was she advised to seek independent advice. Accordingly, she was not aware of the amount of the loan. Once the existing mortgage debt was settled, the husband used the remainder of the loan to speculate on the stock market and, in the 1987 stock market crash, he lost a substantial amount, with the result that he could no longer continue to repay mortgage instalments as they became due. The plaintiffs now sought an order for possession of the matrimonial home, which the wife contested on the ground that she had been induced to sign the relevant documents by misrepresentation, duress and undue influence. The trial judge held that there was actual undue influence, but this decision was reversed in the Court of Appeal on the ground that there was no manifest disadvantage to the wife in entering into the mortgage transaction. This decision, in turn, was reversed by the House of Lords on the ground that, in cases of ‘actual undue influence’, there is no requirement of manifest disadvantage, thereby finding in favour of the wife: CIBC Mortgages plc v Pitt [1994] 1 AC 200, p 207

1995 ◽  
pp. 417-419
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Applied Pressure ◽  
Undue Influence ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Mortgage Debt ◽  
Stock Market Crash ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Holiday Home ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Stated Purpose

Act of State as a Defence Against a British Subject

1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. G. Collier
Keyword(s):  
Constitutional Law ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Recent Case ◽  
Correct Interpretation ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Difference Of Opinion ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal

The law surrounding the doctrine of act of state is perhaps one of the most confusing parts of constitutional law, for both its meaning and application are susceptible of several different interpretations. In particular the rule that act of state can be no defence against an action by a British subject, or, to put it more precisely, that there can be no act of state between the Crown and a British subject is one whose limits are not entirely clear. The recent case of Naim Nissan v. Attorney-General has brought the matter to the fore in what is thought to be a novel situation, wherein the question arose whether act of state can be a defence to an action by a British subject if the act has been executed by the Crown outside the Crown's dominions. The case gave rise to a difference of opinion between the judge at first instance and the Court of Appeal, and now that leave to appeal has been granted to the House of Lords, there arises an opportunity to examine act of state in several of its aspects.In this discussion it will be argued that the law as it appears now to stand is not necessarily a correct interpretation of the precedents, and that if it is, occasion now presents itself for a fresh formulation of the rules upon a more logical and up-to-date basis.It is first proposed to explain what is meant by the term “act of state” in this context, to try to establish its relationship with the prerogative, and to examine two aspects of it, that is (i) where a claimant is attempting to use an act of state as the foundation of his action, and (ii) where the Crown is attempting to defeat an action by an individual by the plea of act of state.

Rationality and the Rule of Law in Offences Against the Person

1994 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 502-523 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gardner
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Justice System ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
The Law ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Law Commission

The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 is much disparaged by today's criminal lawyers. Its provisions have been described as “impenetrable” by the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords could not conceal its dissatisfaction with what is called “the irrational result of this piecemeal legislation”. Andrew Ashworth has written of the “antiquated and illogical structure” of an Act which the Law Commission regards as “unsatisfactory in very many respects”. Most recently Brooke J., launching the latest version of the Commission's reform package, lambasted the operation of the 1861 Act as “a disgrace”, and claimed that this hostile view is shared in every corner of the criminal justice system.

MORE SHOCK HORROR FOR EMPLOYEES

1998 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 235-273
Author(s):  
JENNIFER PAYNE
Keyword(s):  
High Pressure ◽  
Depressive Illness ◽  
Duty Of Care ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Physical Proximity ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Pressure Water ◽  
Nervous Shock ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In Hunter v. British Coal Corporation [1998] 2 All E.R. 97 an employee, Mr. Hunter, hit a high pressure water hydrant with the vehicle he was driving at the time, fracturing the hydrant and thereby threatening to flood the mine. One of his fellow employees, Mr. Carter, attempted to help him shut off the valve. They did not succeed and Mr. Hunter went to fetch further assistance. When he was 30 yards away the hydrant exploded, killing Mr. Carter. Mr. Hunter initially assumed that Mr. Carter was unharmed, but when he was informed of the death 15 minutes later he blamed himself and suffered a shock which triggered a two-year depressive illness. The trial judge found as a fact that the accident (and the death) had been caused by the fault of the defendant employer, which had failed to observe the relevant regulations about the siting of the hydrant, and had not been caused or contributed to by Mr. Hunter in any way. Could Mr. Hunter recover damages from his employer for the shock which he suffered on hearing about a death which he did not witness but for which he felt himself to be responsible? The trial judge held not and the majority of the Court of Appeal agreed, but their reasoning demonstrates some of the confusion surrounding this topic. It was accepted by all members of the Court of Appeal that if Mr. Hunter was classified as a secondary victim he would fail in his claim for nervous shock since he lacked, amongst other things, the necessary physical proximity required by the House of Lords in Alcock: he had witnessed neither the accident itself nor its aftermath. The only way in which he could recover was if he could bring himself within some other category, either (i) because he could be regarded as a primary victim or (ii) purely on the basis of the contractual duty of care which the defendant owed him as his employer.

GOOD CHARACTER DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS: AN EXERCISE IN CONTAINMENT

2015 ◽  
Vol 74 (3) ◽  
pp. 388-392
Author(s):  
Roderick Munday
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Trials ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Court Of Appeal

IN criminal trials, just as a bad character may count against an accused, so a good character may operate in an accused's favour. It was settled by the Court of Appeal in Vye [1993] 1 W.L.R. 471 and by the House of Lords in Aziz [1996] A.C. 41 that any accused who possesses a good character becomes thereby entitled to a mandatory direction (known as a “Vye direction”) in the summing-up. The trial judge is required to instruct jurors that the accused's good character is potentially of dual significance when they come to assess both (1) the credibility of an accused who has testified or who has made admissible, exculpatory pre-trial statements and (2) the likelihood of the accused's having committed the offence(s) charged. But matters do not stop there.

scholarly journals Failing the System? Enfocing the Right to Education in New Zealand

2004 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 735 ◽  
Author(s):  
E J Ryan
Keyword(s):  
New Zealand ◽  
Attorney General ◽  
Right To Education ◽  
London Borough ◽  
High Court ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Borough Council ◽  
The Right ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Domestic Level

At both the international and domestic level, the existence of a right to education is given widespread support. But what are the content and consequences of this right? The meaning of the right to education was examined recently in the context of special education by the High Court and Court of Appeal in Daniels v Attorney-General. The High Court saw the right as a substantive one; the Court of Appeal viewed it in procedural terms. These different conceptions of the right affected the remedies available to the plaintiffs. This article assesses the competing understandings of the education right in NZ, and concludes, particularly in light of the House of Lords' decision in Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council, that the High Court's approach is to be preferred.

they are called the appellants, and again lost. They then appealed to the House of Lords, where they also lost. There was a lot of money at stake: the difference between the £201.60 that the seeds cost as awarded by the Court of Appeal or the £90,000+ that the trial judge awarded. Consider, for a moment, what you have read and what you know so far. Does it seem fair to you that George Mitchell won? If so, why? If not, why not? So far we have considered: (a) Procedural history. (b) Facts. (c) The operative rules of law: • It is known that both common law rules and statutory rules are relevant to the case. • Further, it is known that if the common law rules are found to apply in the seller’s favour he still has to jump the hurdle presented by the statutory rules. • Recall, if there is a clash between common law rules and statutory rules, the statutory rules prevail. (d) A verbatim account of the two issues in the case (however, these are probably not fully comprehended yet, despite Figures 4.13 and 4.14, above!): • It is clear that Lord Bridge will argue through each of the issues. • If the appellants succeed in issue 1 they may still fail overall if they fail over issue 2. (Can you understand why? The answer is in the first sentence of text setting out ‘the second issue’. See Figure 4.14, above.) • Logically, one would expect Lord Bridge to commence with the arguments over issue 1, the common law issue, as this is the gateway to an argument over issue 2 which will only take place if issue 1 is decided in the appellant’s favour (and this is contentious limitation clause what he does). (e) Understanding the clause. This is set out in Figure 4.15, below. Until all of these matters are linked and understood it is not possible to fully comprehend the reasoning in the case. Now take time to consolidate the information we have so far and return to the judgment of Lord Bridge, concentrating on his arguments concerning issue 1 (Appendix 1, p 310, para 3). 4.5.2.5 Stage 4: breaking into Lord Bridge’s speech You will have already read Lord Bridge’s speech by now. It is also now appreciated that the arguments in this case are quite complex and the initial method of breaking into the text for understanding is to look at each paragraph. Paragraphs are intended to convey a new idea. So each paragraph represents an idea or a cluster of ideas. Careful ordering of paragraphs is essential in a piece of writing if a sense of progression is to be maintained. Therefore when reading for understanding a précis of each paragraph begins the process of understanding.

2012 ◽  
pp. 100-100
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Text Setting ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Stage 4 ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Court Of Appeal ◽  
Initial Method

SUBROGATION AND INDEMNITY

2012 ◽  
Vol 71 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Weir
Keyword(s):  
Cold Storage ◽  
Technical Level ◽  
Cleaning Operation ◽  
Trial Judge ◽  
Good Opportunity ◽  
Vicarious Liability ◽  
Forklift Truck ◽  
House Of Lords ◽  
Contract Of Employment ◽  
Court Of Appeal

A Ford employee named Roberts carelessly drove a forklift truck into Morris, a person employed by Ford's cleaning contractor, Cameron. Morris sued Ford. Ford admitted vicarious liability for Roberts' negligence, and claimed against Cameron under a clause in the cleaning contract whereby Cameron had agreed to indemnify Ford against any loss or liability arising out of the cleaning operation. Cameron conceded liability to Ford under this clause and now sought an indemnity from Roberts, the careless employee of Ford: Morris v Ford Motor Co. [1973] 2 W.L.R. 843. The trial judge upheld Cameron's claim, but the Court of Appeal (Stamp L.J. dissenting) allowed Roberts' appeal on the ground that an implied term in the indemnity clause (or, per Lord Denning M.R., equitable considerations) excluded Cameron's normal right, as indemnitor, to be subrogated to Ford's right of recourse against Roberts, their careless employee, this right of recourse having been held by the House of Lords in Lister v Romford Ice & Cold Storage Co. [1957] A.C. 555 to enure even to the insured employer. Cameron has been granted leave to appeal, so the House of Lords has a good opportunity to reconsider Lister. While, at the technical level, Morris turns on the implications of a contract of indemnity and Lister deals with the implications in a contract of employment, the situation underlying both cases raises basic questions about the interaction of tort and that most familiar of indemnity contracts, insurance.

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