Mandatory Retirement: Intergenerational Justice and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms

1987 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-162 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel V. Laselva

AbstractThis study explores two conceptions of justice and their radically different implications for mandatory retirement. The author argues that the case against mandatory retirement rests on a conception of justice which ignores the fact that a society is composed of different generations. Yet the neglect of this seemingly trivial fact leads to serious problems of intergenerational justice; and the note considers both how these problems can be accommodated within a theory of liberal justice, and the implications of that theory for mandatory retirement. The note then considers which of these two conceptions of justice is embodied in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It argues that to ignore considerations of intergenerational justice in mandatory retirement cases amounts to a denial of the equal protection and the equal benefit of the law guaranteed by the Charter.

1988 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-596
Author(s):  
Robert J. Drummond

AbstractSamuel LaSelva has challenged the argument that mandatory retirement is a form of age discrimination and, as such, is unjust and unconstitutional. However, the alternative view that justice requires mandatory retirement seems incompatible with a liberal conception of justice. Moreover, the argument that liberal justice permits mandatory retirement, because of a conflict between rights of different generations, requires a balancing of those rights against one another, and hence against the consequences of their infringement. Such an assessment leads to the conclusion that mandatory retirement is neither constitutional nor just.


Author(s):  
Derrick Bell

The supreme court’s 1896 Decision in Plessy v. Ferguson served to bring the law into a dismal harmony with the nation’s view of race in life. The Court decided that segregation in public facilities through “separate but equal” accommodations for black citizens would satisfy the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth Amendment. The years since the sporadically enforced policies of Reconstruction ended in 1876 had been hard for those former slaves and their offspring whose slavery had legally ended with the passage of the Thir­teenth Amendment in 1865. To ensure their rights to due process and the equal protection of the law, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868 provided that “all persons born or naturalized in the United States, . . . are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” Despite legislation intended to provide enforcement of these rights, the laws were poorly enforced and most were subsequently declared unconstitutional. Corrupting law but relying on intimidation and violence, southern governments stripped blacks of political power. Given meaningful if unspoken assurances that the federal government would not protect black civil rights, conservative southerners regained power utilizing racial fear and hatred to break up competing populist groups of poor black and white farmers. In addition to the disenfranchisement of blacks, whites sought to secure their power through intensive anti-Negro propaganda campaigns championing white supremacy. Literary and scientific leaders published tracts and books intended to “prove” the inhumanity of the Negro. In this hostile climate, segregation laws that had made a brief appearance during Reconstruction were revived across the South, accompanied by waves of violence punctuated by an increase in lynchings and race riots. In an effort both to protest the indignity of segregation and challenge its validity, Homer Plessy, acting for a New Orleans civil rights group, attempted to ride in a railroad car reserved for whites. He was arrested and convicted of violating Louisiana’s 1890 segregation law. On appeal, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Fourteenth Amendment required absolute equality of the two races before the law, adding: “but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.”


Author(s):  
Robin Bradley Kar ◽  
John Lindo

Despite the ‘Age of Genomics’, many scholars who study race and the law resist biological insights into human psychology and behaviour. Contemporary developments make this resistance increasingly untenable. This chapter synthesizes recent findings in genomics and evolutionary psychology, which suggest cause for concern over how racial concepts function in the law. Firstly, racial perceptions engage a ‘folk-biological’ module of psychology, which generates inferences poorly adapted to genomic facts about human populations. Racial perceptions are, therefore, prone to function in ways more prejudicial than probative of many issues relevant to criminal and civil liability. Secondly, many folk biological inferences function automatically, unconsciously, and without animus or discriminatory intent. Hence, current equal protection doctrine, which requires a finding of discriminatory intent and is a central mechanism for guaranteeing people equal treatment under the law, is poorly suited to that task. These facts support but complicate several claims made by Critical Race Theorists.


1991 ◽  
Vol 122 (5) ◽  
pp. 12-14
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Gregory
Keyword(s):  

2017 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Leonid Sirota

In R v Jordan, the Supreme Court of Canada held, by a 5-4 majority and over the vigorous disagreement of the concurrence, that criminal prosecutions in which a trial does not conclude by a set deadline will be presumed to breach the right to be tried within a reasonable time, protected by section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The acceptable length of proceedings set out in the decision is of 18 months from the day charges are laid for cases that proceed without a preliminary inquiry, and 30 months otherwise. The Crown can still show that exceptional circumstances outside of its control have arisen and can explain — and excuse — a case taking longer than that, but unless it does so, a stay of proceedings will be the automatic consequence of such delay. Meanwhile, an accused will be able to show that delay below these ceilings is unconstitutionally unreasonable, but only by demonstrating not only that the delay is “markedly” greater than reasonable, but also that he or she diligently sought to have the case heard sooner.


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