La justicia como imparcialidad, progreso y perfección

In this article I analyze the justification of rawlsian anti-perfectionism, present in both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. My aim is to show how justice as fairness, Rawls's conception of justice, lacks stability because of it. As an alternative to his anti-perfectionism, I propose, in the second part, the idea of progress as practical perfectionism by John Dewey. I argue that a perfectionist liberalism of this kind does not undermine reasonable pluralism as Rawls argued. Also I argue that it is indispensable to establish a liberal society that is stable. In the end, I briefly show how the private sphere could be affected once the idea of progress is part of a conception of liberal justice.

What is a Child?

This chapter outlines an account of what it means to be a child, and why childhood matters as a moral category. I argue that despite concerns, a theory should take childhood simply to mean people below the age of 18. I argue that childhood matters because children’s malleability and vulnerability mean they are poorly served by existing accounts of liberal justice.

Freedom and Justice in Trade Governance

Two recent books consider the future of trade governance. Consent and Trade proposes reforms to trade agreements so that states can consent more freely to their terms. On Trade Justice defends reforms to the World Trade Organization, arguing that multilateralism is the foundation for a “new global deal” on trade. Each book describes trade's distinctive features and proposes a principle to regulate both trade and trade governance. Consent and Trade defends a principle of respect for state consent in trade agreements. On Trade Justice offers a theory of trade justice that requires nonexploitation. Consent and nonexploitation are important principles for economic exchanges. However, trade governance and trade itself are different forms of cooperation, with different agents and different interests at stake. Consent and nonexploitation are less compelling as principles for trade governance than for trade itself. Both books understate the conflict between their principles for trade governance and liberal justice.

Justice and the Excluded, Part 1

This chapter discusses arguments in favor of the thought that exclusion itself is incompatible with liberal justice; all borders, on this analysis, would be open in a just world. The chapter examines the concept of justice, as given in John Rawls, and then uses this concept to discuss why arguments in favor of open borders won’t work. Four arguments are discussed: the arguments from arbitrariness, from distributive justice, from coherence with existing rights, and from the injustice of coercion. None of these, the chapter concludes, pay adequate attention to the uniquely political nature of the relationship of fellow citizens.

Justice, Migration, and Mercy

Public political debate about migration has become increasingly important and increasingly heated; substantive engagement with the morality of migration, however, is more uncommon. This book defends a moderate account of the right to exclude, on which the state may exclude some unwanted would-be migrants—but on which there are significant constraints on how and when that right can be exercised. The book grounds this in a particular vision of how exclusion might be justified, on which states are possessed of a presumptive right to avoid unwanted forms of political relationship. This account of the right to exclude is then applied in more specific questions of justice in migration, such as the permissibility of travel bans and carrier sanctions. The book also offers a particular vision about how to go beyond questions of right and liberal justice, toward a declaration of the sort of community we wish to be. The book identifies the moral notion of mercy as a central one for the moral analysis of migration; we ought to show mercy and justice in the construction of migration policy, and each of these moral norms has a role to play in public discourse.

Liberal Justice: Kant, Rawls and Human Rights

Kant’s practical philosophy, Rawls’s theory of justice and contemporary human rights thinking are landmarks in liberal discussions of justice. Each forms part of a powerful tradition of political thought, and although their substantive accounts of justice diverge at many points, they also overlap in substantial ways. This article focuses not on their substantive claims about justice, or about other ethical standards, but on their differing views of the questions to be addressed, on their proposed justifications for standards of justice, and on a limited range of questions about interpreting and institutionalizing those standards.

International Migration and Human Rights

In this chapter, I bring non-ideal theory to bear on the ethics of immigration. In particular, I explore what the obligations of liberal states would be if they were to attempt to implement migration arrangements that conform to liberal-cosmopolitan principles. I argue that some of the obligations states have are feasibility-insensitive, while some are feasibility-sensitive. I show that such obligations can have as their content both the inclusion and exclusion of prospective immigrants, and that they can be grounded in the requirements of liberal justice, mere capacity to assist, as well as past or foreseeable contribution to harm. The chapter therefore explores the possibility of an international migration regime that takes human rights seriously whilst avoiding the twin pitfalls of strict immigration restrictions and the complete liberalization of immigration.