Hume on Causal Contiguity and Causal Succession

Dialogue ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-282
Author(s):  
Tom L. Beauchamp

Hume notoriously maintains that contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction are individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of causation. While his arguments for the necessity of constant conjunction have been thoroughly dissected, his arguments for contiguity and succession have generally been either ignored or misstated. I hope both to correct this unfortunate state of affairs and to show some fatal defects in Hume's account.The pertinent passages in Hume's writings acknowledge three conceivable ways in which the temporal relation between causes and effects might be construed: (i) as separated by some interval; (ii) as perfectly contiguous, so that the effect succeeds the cause in the very next moment; (iii) as perfectly contemporaneous, existing at the same moment. Hume defends the correctness of (ii) and denies the tenability of both (i) and (iii).

2007 ◽  
Vol 44 (02) ◽  
pp. 492-505
Author(s):  
M. Molina ◽  
M. Mota ◽  
A. Ramos

We investigate the probabilistic evolution of a near-critical bisexual branching process with mating depending on the number of couples in the population. We determine sufficient conditions which guarantee either the almost sure extinction of such a process or its survival with positive probability. We also establish some limiting results concerning the sequences of couples, females, and males, suitably normalized. In particular, gamma, normal, and degenerate distributions are proved to be limit laws. The results also hold for bisexual Bienaymé–Galton–Watson processes, and can be adapted to other classes of near-critical bisexual branching processes.


1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 851-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. J. Brockwell

The Laplace transform of the extinction time is determined for a general birth and death process with arbitrary catastrophe rate and catastrophe size distribution. It is assumed only that the birth rates satisfyλ0= 0,λj> 0 for eachj> 0, and. Necessary and sufficient conditions for certain extinction of the population are derived. The results are applied to the linear birth and death process (λj=jλ, µj=jμ) with catastrophes of several different types.


1986 ◽  
Vol 23 (04) ◽  
pp. 1013-1018
Author(s):  
B. G. Quinn ◽  
H. L. MacGillivray

Sufficient conditions are presented for the limiting normality of sequences of discrete random variables possessing unimodal distributions. The conditions are applied to obtain normal approximations directly for the hypergeometric distribution and the stationary distribution of a special birth-death process.


1992 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 261-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alan G. Kamhi

My response to Fey’s article (1985; reprinted 1992, this issue) focuses on the confusion caused by the application of simplistic phonological definitions and models to the assessment and treatment of children with speech delays. In addition to having no explanatory adequacy, such definitions/models lead either to assessment and treatment procedures that are similarly focused or to procedures that have no clear logical ties to the models with which they supposedly are linked. Narrowly focused models and definitions also usually include no mention of speech production processes. Bemoaning this state of affairs, I attempt to show why it is important for clinicians to embrace broad-based models of phonological disorders that have some explanatory value. Such models are consistent with assessment procedures that are comprehensive in nature and treatment procedures that focus on linguistic, as well as motoric, aspects of speech.


2007 ◽  
pp. 5-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Searle

The author claims that an institution is any collectively accepted system of rules (procedures, practices) that enable us to create institutional facts. These rules typically have the form of X counts as Y in C, where an object, person, or state of affairs X is assigned a special status, the Y status, such that the new status enables the person or object to perform functions that it could not perform solely in virtue of its physical structure, but requires as a necessary condition the assignment of the status. The creation of an institutional fact is, thus, the collective assignment of a status function. The typical point of the creation of institutional facts by assigning status functions is to create deontic powers. So typically when we assign a status function Y to some object or person X we have created a situation in which we accept that a person S who stands in the appropriate relation to X is such that (S has power (S does A)). The whole analysis then gives us a systematic set of relationships between collective intentionality, the assignment of function, the assignment of status functions, constitutive rules, institutional facts, and deontic powers.


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