Approaching Collectivity Collectively: A Multi-Disciplinary Account of Collective Action

There has been considerable progress in investigating collective actions in the last decades. However, the real progress is different from what many scholars take it to be. It lies in the fact that there is by now a wealth of different approaches from a variety of fields. Each approach has carved out fruitful mechanisms for explaining collective action, but is also faced with limitations. Given that situation, we submit that the next step in investigating collective action is to acknowledge the plurality of approaches and bring them into dialogue. With this aim in mind, the present article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of some of the to our mind most relevant approaches to collective action in current debates. We begin with the collective intentionality framework, the team reasoning approach, and social identity theory. Then, we move to ecological social psychology, participatory sense-making, and, through the lenses of those frameworks, dynamical systems theory. Finally, we discuss practice theory. Against this background, we provide a proposal for a synthesis of the successful explanatory mechanisms as they have been carved out by the different research programs. The suggestion is, roughly, to understand collective action as dynamical interaction of a self-organizing system with its environment, shaped by a process of collective sense-making.

A model-based approach to social ontology

This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, but less demanding than Tuomela’s own description of his account as a philosophical theory of the social world. My approach is also suggested to be applicable to many (but not necessarily all) other methodologically naturalist accounts of collective intentionality and social ontology.

On collectively assigning features to artifacts

The common notion of artifacts characterizes them as the products of successful activities of their makers, guided by intentions that such objects would instantiate certain features, such as their specific functions. Many counterexamples, however, reveal the unsuitability of the common notion. In the face of this acknowledgment, the paper explores the possibility that features of artifacts, and more specifically, the possession of their functions, may arise, at least partially, from collective assignments. In order to achieve the mentioned goal, the paper critically examines some notions and theses put forward by John Searle (1996; 2010) and others. Its main result, however, consists in offering and elucidating an original thesis, namely, that the functions of many artifacts would be maintained, partially, by forms of continuous collective intentionality, which can involve conscious or unconscious, active or inactive collective intentional states. Keywords: Artifacts, assignment of function, collective intentionality, maintenance of function.

"Do your part: Stay apart": Collective intentionality and collective (in)action in US governor's COVID-19 press conferences

This mixed-methods study examines how political leaders mobilize collective intentionality during the COVID-19 pandemic in nine US States, and how collective intentionality differs across republican and democratic administrations. The results of our qualitative and quantitative analyses show that i) political leaders establish collective intentionality by emphasizing unity, vulnerability, action, and community boundaries; ii) political leaders’ call to collective action clashes with the inaction required by health guidelines; iii) social inequalities received little attention across all states compared to other themes; iv) collective intentionality in democratic administrations is linked to individuals’ agency and actions, suggesting a bottom-up approach. Conversely, in republican administrations individuals’ contributions are downplayed compared to work and state-level action, indicating a top-down approach. This study demonstrates the theoretical and empirical value of collective intentionality in sociological research, and contributes to a better understanding of leadership and prosociality in times of crisis.

Shared action: An existential phenomenological account

Drawing on recent phenomenological discussions of collective intentionality and existential phenomenological accounts of agency, this article proposes a novel interpretation of shared action. First, I argue that we should understand action on the basis of how an environment pre-reflectively solicits agents to behave based on (a) the affordances or goals inflected by their abilities and dispositions and (b) their self-referential commitment to a project that is furthered by these affordances. Second, I show that this definition of action is sufficiently flexible to account for not only individual action (in which both (a) and (b) refer only to an individual) but also several distinct subtypes of shared action. My thesis is that behaviour counts as shared action if and only if it is caused by a solicitation in which either (a) the goals, or (b) the commitments, or both (a) goals and (b) commitments are joint, i.e., depend on several individuals. We thereby get three distinct subtypes of shared actions: (i) jointly coordinated individually committed action, (ii) individually coordinated jointly committed action, and (iii) jointly coordinated jointly committed action.

Collective dynamics support group drumming, reduce variability, and stabilize tempo drift

Humans are social animals who engage in a variety of collective activities requiring coordinated action. Among these, music is a defining and ancient aspect of human sociality. Social interaction has largely been studied in dyadic contexts. The presence of multiple agents engaged in the same task space creates different constraints and possibilities that have been studied more extensively in nonhuman animal behaviour. We addressed whether collective dynamics play a role in human circle drumming. The task was to synchronize in a group with an initial reference pattern and then maintain synchronization after it was muted. We varied the number of drummers, from solo to dyad, quartet, and octet. The observed lower variability, lack of speeding up, smoother individual dynamics, and leader-less inter-personal coordination indicated that stability increased as group size increased, a sort of temporal wisdom of crowds. We propose a hybrid continuous-discrete Kuramoto model for emergent group synchronization with pulse-based coupling that exhibits a mean field positive feedback loop. This research has theoretical implications about collective intentionality and social cognition.

Collective Action and Social Ontology in Thomas Aquinas

In this paper I argue that there are resources in the work of Thomas Aquinas that amount to a unique approach to what David P. Schweikard and Hans Bernhard Schmid’s call the “Central Problem” facing theorists of collective intentionality and action. That is to say, Aquinas can be said to affirm both (1) the “Individual Ownership Claim” and (2) the “Irreducibility Claim,” coherently and compellingly. Regarding the Individual Ownership Claim, I argue that Aquinas’s concept of “general virtue” (virtus generalis) buttresses an account of the way in which individuals act collectively qua individuals, i.e., without invoking hive minds or other scientifically problematic phenomena. Further, with respect to the Irreducibility Claim (2), I argue that Aquinas’s concept of “common good” (bonum commune) offers an account of the way in which some powers and acts of social groups are importantly irreducible to those of their members. Considered together, I argue that these two positions in Aquinas are correlative, and therefore amount to a coherent account of collective action and group agency, respectively.

Debunking the holy trinity: competition, individualism, and meritocracy

This chapter draws on conceptual resources from debates on collective intentionality and responsibility to call into question the close links between competition, ontological atomism, and individual responsibility implied by meritocracy. Against this ‘holy trinity’, we argue that competition is not reducible to an ontology of atomized agents and individual notions of responsibility, which supposedly justify meritocratic justifications of unequal outcomes in competition. By offering a non-individualist concept of competition, we argue that competitive actions are collective and relational. As a result, responsibility in competition is much more shared between competitors and within competitive teams than is commonly thought. This argument implies that the collective foundations of competition should be more appreciated and that the redistribution of recognition among winners and losers in competition should be reconsidered.

Insulating Peace: Managerial Coordination in Durable Security Complexes

I argue that insulation via managerial coordination is a key element in any explanation about the formation of political regions among states. The key role it plays is as a tool for the maintenance of intra-regional pacific relations in the face of diffusion and contagion processes, resulting from continued security linkages with excluded extra-regional states. In order to explore these dynamics, I propose a new reconceptualization of the concept of managerial coordination based on the basic framework concept mapping tool. This leads to clarity about what managerial coordination does as a dimension of insulation. It also necessitates a revamp of the scale of interstate managerial coordination as a measuring instrument of the intensity of collective intentionality toward insulation among the members of a region. I then map the region concept of durable security complex (DSC) as the scope for the enactment of managerial coordination, based on a review of existing region concepts in the new regionalist literature. I then conduct an ideographic proof-of-concept exercise on three DSCs in the presence or absence of managerial coordination. These are the Scandinavian states, the South Asian regional security complex, and the South American Norther Tier local hierarchy. The exercise provides indicators for a number of theoretical propositions worthy of future evaluation.