Descartes and the Seven Senses of Indifference in Early Modern Philosophy

Dialogue ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 577-602 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Lennon

ABSTRACT: Indifference is a term often used to describe the sort of freedom had by the will according to the libertarian, or Molinist account. It is thought to be a univocal term. In fact, however, it is used in at least seven different ways, in a variety of domains during the early modern period. All of them have plausible roots in Descartes, but he himself uses the term in only one sense, and failure to notice this consistent use by him has bedeviled interpretations of his account of the will.

Author(s):  
Jennifer Marušić

What is the difference between simply thinking about something and judging or believing that something is the case? One finds a remarkable range of answers to this question in the early modern period. A traditional approach to judgment has its origins in Aristotle and treats judgment as closely related to predication. Judging, on this view, is a matter of affirming or denying something of something else. Affirming and denying, in turn, are different forms of predication: affirming whiteness of snow results in the judgment that snow is white; denying whiteness of snow results in the judgment that snow is not white. Descartes rejects this approach and instead treats judgment as an act of will. He holds that the intellect or understanding presents us with a complete content for judgment, and then the will, in a separate act, assents or dissents to this content. Spinoza rejects both the Aristotelian and Cartesian views by holding, against the Aristotelian view, that every idea has propositional content and also, against the Cartesian view, that every idea is an affirmation. Spinoza claims that judgment or affirmation just consists in the causal influence that an idea has on us, and he holds that all ideas have some influence. Thus, Spinoza holds the radical view that all ideas are judgments. Finally, Hume also rejects both the Aristotelian and Cartesian views. Against the Aristotelians, he denies that what is judged or believed must always be a proposition with a subject–predicate structure. Against the Cartesians, he denies that belief is in any way subject to the will. Finally, against Spinoza he insists that there are some ideas that are merely conceived and not believed or judged. Hume holds that beliefs differ from ideas that are not believed in a way that makes beliefs more like perceptual experiences.


Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes work on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The core of the subject matter is philosophy and its history. But the volume’s chapters reflect the fact that philosophy in the early modern period was much broader in its scope than it is currently taken to be and included a great deal of what now belongs to the natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy in the period was closely connected with other disciplines, such as theology, law and medicine, and with larger questions of social, political, and religious history. Volume 10 includes chapters dedicated to a wide set of topics in the philosophies of Thomas White, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, and Hume.


Mind ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 128 (512) ◽  
pp. 1117-1147
Author(s):  
Anat Schechtman

Abstract Many historical and philosophical studies treat infinity as an exclusively quantitative notion, whose proper domain of application is mathematics and physics. The main aim of this paper is to disentangle, by critically examining, three notions of infinity in the early modern period, and to argue that one—but only one—of them is quantitative. One of these non-quantitative notions concerns being or reality, while the other concerns a particular iterative property of an aggregate. These three notions will emerge through examination of three central figures in the period: Locke (for quantitative infinity), Descartes (ontic infinity), and Leibniz (iterative infinity).


2011 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 406-424
Author(s):  
Stephen Gaukroger

Abstract Contrary to most modern interpretations, in the early modern period, history was an indispensable resource for many philosophers. The different uses of history by Bacon, Gassendi, Locke, and Hume are explored to establish the role of history as a resource in early-modern philosophy.


2021 ◽  
pp. 186-222
Author(s):  
Alison Peterman

The world soul was often a target of attack in early modern natural philosophy, on grounds of impiety and explanatory vacuity. But it also played an important role in debates about two of the most important questions in natural philosophy: How does nature depend on God, and what explains nature’s organization? As an answer to those questions, it lived on through the early modern period, sustained especially by philosophers who argued that individuals in nature cannot be understood in isolation from the whole. In this chapter it is argued that in this guise, it served as an alternative model of explanation in a context that increasingly emphasized explanation in terms of laws of nature, and that this reflects the fact that these two models represent two fundamentally competing approaches to natural philosophical explanation.


Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes work on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The core of the subject matter is philosophy and its history. But the volume’s chapters reflect the fact that philosophy in the early modern period was much broader in its scope than it is currently taken to be and included a great deal of what now belongs to the natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy in the period was closely connected with other disciplines, such as theology, and with larger questions of social, political, and religious history. Volume 8 includes chapters dedicated to a wide set of topics in the philosophies of Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Wolff, and Kant.


Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy is an annual series, presenting a selection of the best current work in the history of early modern philosophy. It focuses on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—the extraordinary period of intellectual flourishing that begins, roughly, with Descartes and his contemporaries and ends with Kant. It also publishes work on thinkers or movements outside of that framework, provided they are important in illuminating early modern thought. The core of the subject matter is philosophy and its history. But the volume’s chapters reflect the fact that philosophy in the early modern period was much broader in its scope than it is currently taken to be and included a great deal of what now belongs to the natural sciences. Furthermore, philosophy in the period was closely connected with other disciplines, such as theology, law, and medicine, and with larger questions of social, political, and religious history. Volume 9 includes chapters dedicated to a wide set of topics in the philosophies of Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Leibniz, Hume, and Kant.


The ancient topic of universals was central to scholastic philosophy, which raised the question of whether universals exist as Platonic forms, as instantiated Aristotelian forms, as concepts abstracted from singular things, or as words that have universal signification. It might be thought that this question lost its importance after the decline of scholasticism in the modern period. However, the fourteen contributions to this volume indicate that the issue of universals retained its vitality in modern philosophy. Modern philosophers in fact were interested in three sets of issues concerning universals: (1) issues concerning the ontological status of universals, (2) issues concerning the psychology of the formation of universal concepts or terms, and (3) issues concerning the value and use of universal concepts or terms in the acquisition of knowledge. Chapters in this volume consider the various forms of “Platonism,” “conceptualism,” and “nominalism” (and distinctive combinations thereof) that emerged from the consideration of such issues in the work of modern philosophers. The volume covers not only the canonical modern figures, namely, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant, but also more neglected figures such as Pierre Gassendi, Pierre-Sylvain Regis, Nicolas Malebranche, Henry More, Ralph Cudworth, and John Norris.


Author(s):  
Stefano Di Bella ◽  
Tad M. Schmaltz

The different problems related to the topic of universals were central to the philosophical agenda from antiquity and especially during the medieval era, but they lost this centrality and seemed virtually to disappear during the early modern period. During this period, for instance, there was widespread hostility toward the essentialist hylomorphic framework in terms of which the issue of universals had been debated in the scholastic literature. Nonetheless, what occurred in the early modern period was more a transformation than a disappearance of this issue. This chapter introduces the history of the concept of universals and outlines the contents of the chapters in this volume.


Author(s):  
Emma Gilby

Descartes’s Fictions traces common movements in early modern philosophy and literary method. This volume reassesses the significance of Descartes’s writing by bringing his philosophical output into contact with the literary treatises, exempla, and debates of his age. Arguing that humanist theorizing about the art of poetry represents a vital intellectual context for Descartes’s work, the volume offers readings of the controversies to which this poetic theory gives rise, with particular reference to the genre of tragicomedy, the question of verisimilitude, and the figures of Guez de Balzac and Pierre Corneille. Drawing on what Descartes says about, and to, his many contemporaries and correspondents embedded in the early modern republic of letters, this volume shows that poetics provides a repository of themes and images to which he returns repeatedly: fortune, method, error, providence, passion, and imagination, amongst others. Like the poets and theorists of the early modern period, Descartes is also drawn to the forms of attention that people may bring to his work. This interest finds expression in the mature Cartesian metaphysics of the Meditations, as well as, later, in the moral philosophy of his correspondence with Elisabeth of Bohemia or the Passions of the Soul. Some of the tropes of modern secondary criticism—a comparison of Descartes and Corneille, or the portrayal of Descartes as a ‘tragic’ figure—are also re-evaluated. This volume thus bridges the gap between Cartesian criticism and late-humanist literary culture in France.


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