Steven Wright, The United States and Persian Gulf Security: The Foundations of the War on Terror (Reading, U.K.: Ithaca Press, 2007). Pp. 248. $54.50 cloth.

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 172-174
Author(s):  
William L. Dowdy
Author(s):  
Richard F. Kuisel

This chapter discusses the confluence of events that shaped relations between France and the United States in the 1990s. These include the war in the Persian Gulf, which had barely subsided when a downward spiral into ethnic strife seized the inhabitants of Yugoslavia. At the same time the United States and France engaged in diplomatic brinkmanship over trade and waged a contest over reform of the Atlantic Alliance. Transatlantic sparring often occurred on many fronts and one struggle tended to complicate the other. The discussion in this chapter will be thematic rather than chronological, beginning with war, and then security, followed by trade, the “indispensable nation,” and more war, and concluding with the topic of the hyperpower.


2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.


2021 ◽  
pp. 108-151
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter studies the Persian Gulf War. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States was focused primarily on Europe, where rapid changes to the regional security order provided early signals of the nation’s dawning preeminence, but few indications of what a “new world order” would entail. Beyond the Soviet Union, there were no clear threats to U.S. global interests, and emergent American grand strategy envisioned a world where economic and diplomatic power would predominate, resulting in some measure of multipolarity. Yet the shock and awe of the war revealed that the United States stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, backed by international political support—including from a surprisingly deferential Russia—as well as unprecedented military preponderance. Washington therefore moved toward a more militarily assertive form of hegemony, characterized by the discretionary use of force to enforce the terms of the “new world order.” The war also inaugurated the preoccupation with Iraq and nonproliferation as central focuses of post–Cold War foreign policy.


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