“Beyond Containment”

2021 ◽  
pp. 108-151
Author(s):  
Rebecca Lissner

This chapter studies the Persian Gulf War. Prior to the Persian Gulf War, the United States was focused primarily on Europe, where rapid changes to the regional security order provided early signals of the nation’s dawning preeminence, but few indications of what a “new world order” would entail. Beyond the Soviet Union, there were no clear threats to U.S. global interests, and emergent American grand strategy envisioned a world where economic and diplomatic power would predominate, resulting in some measure of multipolarity. Yet the shock and awe of the war revealed that the United States stood alone as the world’s sole superpower, backed by international political support—including from a surprisingly deferential Russia—as well as unprecedented military preponderance. Washington therefore moved toward a more militarily assertive form of hegemony, characterized by the discretionary use of force to enforce the terms of the “new world order.” The war also inaugurated the preoccupation with Iraq and nonproliferation as central focuses of post–Cold War foreign policy.

1992 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-23
Author(s):  
Mathew Kanjirathinkal ◽  
Joseph V. Hickey

Author(s):  
Spencer D. Bakich

The Persian Gulf War of 1990–1991 was something of a paradox. From the American perspective, the war had the hallmarks of a resounding victory. Responding to a flagrant case of interstate aggression by Iraq against Kuwait, the George H. W. Bush administration assembled a substantial international coalition to deter further Iraqi attacks against its neighbors in the Gulf and to compel Saddam Hussein into quitting Kuwait, to avoid war. When the latter proved infeasible, the United States led that coalition in forcibly ousting Iraq’s military from Kuwait, substantially degrading Iraqi combat power in the process. The war’s outcome resulted from an auspiciously altered geopolitical landscape at the end of the Cold War, the overwhelming superiority of American power vis-à-vis Iraq, and a US decision-making process that tightly knitted military and diplomatic objectives into a coherent—and coherently executed—wartime strategy. However, America’s historically lopsided victory in the Persian Gulf War proved fleeting. Iraq’s surviving military forces retained the capacity to crush domestic challenges to the Ba’athist regime and to threaten its Gulf neighbors. President Bush’s vision of a post-war new world order notwithstanding, Gulf security depended heavily on continuing military missions years after the Persian Gulf War ended. Despite wartime tactical and strategic successes, grand strategic success eluded the United States in the years after the war.


2021 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 65-69
Author(s):  
Dmitrii N. Khristenko

The article examines the foreign policy concept of the «new world order» of George Herbert Walker Bush, which he put forward during the Gulf War (1990-1991). Despite its short duration, the Middle East conflict has become a symbol of the transformation of international relations initiated by the crisis of the bipolar system and arising of the United States as the main military and political world power. Consequently, Washington sought to rethink its role in the world arena. This task was intended to solve by the concept of a «new world order». The main sources for this article were the memoirs of the former American president and James Addison Baker III (U.S. Secretary of State), documents of White House’ administration, as well as publications of «Foreign Affairs» – the most influential journal on international relations in the United States. The research methodology includes the space-time analysis of Fernand Paul Achille Braudel, historical-descriptive and historical-genetic methods. It is noted that the foreign policy concept of a «new world order» was in the centre of public attention and caused a heated discussion in the United States, as a result of which was rejected its main element – reliance on allies and the rule of international law. The attempts of Russian diplomacy to propose a corrected interpretation of the concept of a «new world order» did not meet the understanding overseas. Washington took a course towards sole leadership in the world that triggered the deterioration of the state of affairs in the world arena in the long term.


Author(s):  
Elizabeth Grimm Arsenault

This chapter details the history of U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions, and later the UN Convention Against Torture, from Vietnam through September 10, 2001. The norm of humane POW treatment was solidified by U.S. experience in Vietnam as well as U.S. POW activities during the 1980s and 1990s. Military practice and doctrine from Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf War indicate a strong commitment to upholding the Geneva Conventions and the CAT. By integrating Army lawyers into operational planning and crafting a policy of widely extending POW status, the improvement in detainee treatment that occurred during these conflicts strongly reflects the redress for U.S. lapses in Vietnam.


1999 ◽  
Vol 78 (4) ◽  
pp. 131
Author(s):  
Eliot A. Cohen ◽  
Edward J. Marolda ◽  
Robert John Schneller

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