The Interplay between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 310-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cordula Droege

International human rights law and international humanitarian law are traditionally two distinct branches of law, one dealing with the protection of persons from abusive power, the other with the conduct of parties to an armed conflict. Yet, developments in international and national jurisprudence and practice have led to the recognition that these two bodies of law not only share a common humanist ideal of dignity and integrity but overlap substantially in practice. The most frequent examples are situations of occupation or non-international armed conflicts where human rights law complements the protection provided by humanitarian law.This article provides an overview of the historical developments that led to the increasing overlap between human rights law and humanitarian law. It then seeks to analyse the ways in which the interplay between human rights law and humanitarian law can work in practice. It argues that two main concepts inform their interaction: The first is complementarity between their norms in the sense that in most cases, especially for the protection of persons in the power of a party to the conflict, they mutually reinforce each other. The second is the principle of lex specialis in the cases of conflict between the norms.

2015 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne

AbstractThis article offers a fresh examination of the distinction drawn in international humanitarian law (IHL) between international and non-international armed conflicts. In particular, it considers this issue from the under-explored perspective of the influence of international human rights law (IHRL). It is demonstrated how, over time, the effect of IHRL on this distinction in IHL has changed dramatically. Whereas traditionally IHRL encouraged the partial elimination of the distinction between types of armed conflict, more recently it has been invoked in debates in a manner that would preserve what remains of the distinction. By exploring this important issue, it is hoped that the present article will contribute to the ongoing debates regarding the future development of the law of non-international armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Sandesh Sivakumaran

This chapter examines international humanitarian law, the principal body of international law which applies in times of armed conflict, and which seeks to balance the violence inherent in an armed conflict with the dictates of humanity. International humanitarian law protects the civilian population from the ravages of conflict, and establishes limitations on the means and methods of combat. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 considers the nature of international humanitarian law and identifies some of its cardinal principles and key rules. Section 3 explores the similarities and differences between international humanitarian law and international human rights law, comparing and contrasting their historical origins and conceptual approaches. Given that international humanitarian law applies during armed conflict, Section 4 considers whether there is a need for international human rights law also to apply. Section 5 ascertains the relationship between the two bodies of law and Section 6 considers some of the difficulties with the application of international human rights law in time of armed conflict.


2021 ◽  
Vol 19 (32) ◽  
pp. 32
Author(s):  
Sidney Cesar Silva Guerra ◽  
Luz E. Nagle ◽  
Ádria Saviano Fabricio da Silva

This article aims to revisit the interrelationship between International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), in honour of their respective normative scopes and in order to carry out an analysis of their complementary or supplementary application, towards the construction of a more appropriate tool for the protection of human beings in extreme situations, as it occurs during armed conflicts. This is because, amid the multifaceted vulnerabilities that accumulate in today's conflicts, it is essential to provide the most effective source of protection - proportional to the demands for protection that are manifested today, particularly in military occupations around the world, whose occurrence will be the focus of this research. As for the method of approach concerning the logical basis of the investigation, the hypothetical-deductive method was selected, insofar as the corroboration or falsification of the main hypothesis about the effective complementary and harmonious application of IHRL will be tested to cases of human rights violations in International Armed Conflicts in the military occupation modality. Given this framework, the core of this work lies in the understanding of the praxis for the complementary application of both aspects in armed conflicts, considering not only International Human Rights Law as lex generalis, but their effective overlap to the detriment of International Humanitarian Law, when it is most beneficial to human protection in the cases of Military Occupations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-58
Author(s):  
Sardar M. A. Waqar Khan Arif

Human rights are available to everyone on the basis of humanity. Universality, non-discrimination, equality and inalienability are core principles governing International Human rights Law (IHRL). The law governing armed conflict or war is known as International humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of armed conflict, IHRL poses certain obligations on states along with humanitarian obligations. In this context, this article identifies the international human rights obligations of States in armed conflict. It argues that States must respect, promote, protect and fulfill human rights obligations of individuals, in the case of armed conflict, with increasing and serious concern, by analyzing the applicable legal framework under IHRL. It also addresses the extraterritorial application of IHRL and its limitations and derogations in armed conflict. Further, it discusses contemporary challenges for States in jurisdictional applicability and implementation of IHRL. To that extent, the argument developed throughout this article is that States have obligations under IHRL, irrespective of humanitarian obligations, not only in peace situations but also in the case of war or armed conflict.


Author(s):  
Ian Park

A state’s procedural right to life obligations relate to the circumstances in which a state must conduct an investigation following a death. Procedural right to life obligations also extend to how and when the investigation is conducted, and by whom. This chapter explores these issues in detail and advances a hypothesis in respect of what amounts to a human rights law-compliant investigation that would satisfy a state’s procedural right to life obligations during armed conflict. It also considers the similarities and differences between the requirement to investigate a death pursuant to international humanitarian law and that pursuant to international human rights law.


2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 648-660 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noam Lubell

This article provides a critical examination of the debate over the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law. On the question surrounding the very fact of co-application, it appears that the dominant view supports the co-applicability of the two legal regimes. Opinion is however far from settled on the scope of application of international human rights law, especially insofar as it relates to the issue of extra-territorial applicability. The approach taken in the event of co-applying the two frameworks to specific circumstances, and whether and how one is to use the doctrine of lex specialis, reveals further questions in need of coherent answers. Finally, there remain particular areas in which the co-application faces challenges that must be surmounted, if it is to prove a useful approach. These include the issues of the so-called “war on terror,” the distinction between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello, non-international armed conflicts, and more. Whilst the co-application of the two regimes is now almost undisputed, it appears therefore that obstacles remain that must be dealt with in order for the relationship of the regimes to be of a fully harmonious nature.


2015 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-129 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Stubbins Bates

On September 16, 2014, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) gave its judgment in the case of Hassan v. United Kingdom.This is the Court’s first explicit engagement with the co-applicability of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in relation to detention in international armed conflicts. The judgment is significant for its rejection of the government’s argument that international humanitarian law operates as lex specialis to displace international human rights law entirely during the “active hostilities phase of an international armed conflict.” It is also noteworthy for the majority’s ruling that provisions on detention of prisoners of war and the internment of protected persons in the Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949 could be read into Article 5 (right to liberty and security) of the European Convention on Human Rights (the European Convention), creating a new ground for detention under Article 5(1) in international armed conflicts and modifying the procedural guarantees in Article 5(4).


2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

AbstractThis article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.


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