Lex Specialis: Oversimplifying A More Complex and Multifaceted Relationship?

2007 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 356-395 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nancie Prud'homme

From the adoption of the United Nations' Charter, the interplay between international human rights law and international humanitarian law has been subject to many questions to which scholars, judges and institutions still struggle to provide a clear answer. At present, there are a number of divergent stances on the parallel application of the disciplines, but they are generally elusive as to their exact methodology and supporting legal basis. This article argues that a well-coordinated application of international humanitarian law and international human rights law is vital to ensuring adequate protection during armed conflict and the effective implementation of the legal frameworks. It examines the articulation of the relationship between international humanitarian law and international human rights law through the lex specialis model. Considering the theory of lex specialis, this article questions the widely accepted view that this theoretical model, based on the specificity and generality of the law, can clarify the interplay and facilitate the co-application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law. In light of this, it is argued that a new means is needed to clarify the interplay between the disciplines. This article advocates the substitution of the lex specialis principle and development of a more specific methodology to resolve issues linked with the concurrent jurisdiction of the disciplines. It suggests that the theory of lex specialis yields to a different theoretical model based on multiple pre-determined criteria that balance the reality of conflict with the respect of humanity and protection of individuals.

2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (4) ◽  
pp. 791-827 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christof Heyns ◽  
Dapo Akande ◽  
Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne ◽  
Thompson Chengeta

AbstractThis article provides a holistic examination of the international legal frameworks which regulate targeted killings by drones. The article argues that for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international human rights law. It is argued that the legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. The article considers the important legal challenges that the use of armed drones poses under each of the three legal frameworks mentioned above. It considers the law relating to the use of force by States against non-State groups abroad. This part examines the principles of self-defence and consent, in so far as they may be relied upon to justify targeted killings abroad. The article then turns to some of the key controversies in the application of international humanitarian law to drone strikes. It examines the threshold for non-international armed conflicts, the possibility of a global non-international armed conflict and the question of who may be targeted in a non-international armed conflict. The final substantive section of the article considers the nature and application of the right to life in armed conflict, as well as the extraterritorial application of that right particularly in territory not controlled by the State conducting the strike.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eyassu Gayim

Laws regulate conducts by responding to social and political requirements. This holds true for the law of nations as well. Contemporary international law follows two separate tracks when it comes to regulating human rights and humanitarian questions. If international human rights law and international humanitarian law are intended to protect the dignity and worth of human beings, as it is often said, why follow separate tracks? Does humanity really exist? If it does, how does it relate to human rights? If the two are distinct, where do they converge? This article highlights these questions by revisiting the contours of international law.


Author(s):  
Féilim Ó hAdhmaill ◽  
Mike Ritchie

International Human Rights Law is supposed to operate at all times. However, during war/conflict it is often suspended to address an ‘emergency’. International Humanitarian Law attempts to deal with human rights protections during the specific circumstances of war. However, what happens when states refuse to recognise a conflict situation as a ‘war’? In a world where violent conflict increasingly involves non-state actors, where does that leave existing international human rights’ mechanisms? This chapter looks at the changing forms of conflict globally and the development of what has been termed ‘terrorism’. It critically assesses the concept of ‘terrorism’ and discusses the difficulties it poses for social science, universal human rights and the development of equality, stability and global peace.


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