scholarly journals Strategic Delays and Clustering in Hedge Fund Reported Returns

2017 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
George O. Aragon ◽  
Vikram Nanda

We use a novel database to study the timeliness of hedge fund monthly performance disclosures. Managers engage in strategic timing: poor monthly returns are reported with delay, sometimes clustered with stronger subsequent performance, suggestive of “performance smoothing.” We posit that propensity to delay could reveal operational risk and/or poor managerial quality. Consistent with this, a portfolio strategy that buys (sells) funds with historically timely (untimely) reporting delivers 3% annual-style-adjusted returns. Investor flows are lower following reporting delays, although there are potential benefits to managers from delaying reporting when performance is sufficiently poor. We conclude that timely disclosure is an important consideration for hedge fund managers and investors.

2021 ◽  
pp. 63-86
Author(s):  
Guillermo Baquero ◽  
Marno Verbeek

Hedge fund flows characterize the average opinion of hedge fund investors about managerial skill, expected performance, financial and operational risk. However, liquidity restrictions hamper the ability of investors to rapidly switch from one fund to another. In addition, capacity constraints at the fund or style level may imply that future returns decrease when more money is allocated to a given hedge fund. In this chapter, we provide a detailed overview of what are the drivers, and limitations, of hedge fund flows, how flows are related to measures of past performance, and to what extent flows are able to predict subsequent performance. We also discuss some implications of these relationships, for example in terms of incentives to fund managers.


2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 67-77
Author(s):  
Majed R. Muhtaseb

Purpose The loss of an amount in excess of $100m cash deposit can be disruptive to the operations, definitely the liquidity of the hedge fund. Should a hedge fund liquidity position deteriorate, its compromised solvency could impact its vendors, most notably creditors and prime brokers. Large successful hedge funds do make basic mistakes. Lawyer Marc Dreier committed the criminal act of selling fraudulent promissory notes to hedge funds and others. Mr Drier’s success in selling fraudulent promissory notes was facilitated by his accomplices who posed as fake representatives of legitimate institutions. Drier and team presented bogus “audited financial statements” and forged developer’s signatures, and even went as far as using the unsuspecting institutions’ premises for meetings to meet potential notes buyers to further falsely legitimize the scheme. He had the notes buyers send their payments to his law firm account, to secure the money. His actions cost his victims, who include 13 hedge fund managers, other investors and entities, $400m in addition to his law firm’s employees who also suffered when his law firm was dissolved. For his actions, he was sentenced 20 years in federal prison for investment fraud. This study aims to direct hedge fund investors and other stakeholders to thoroughly vet the compliance function, especially controls on cash disbursements, even if the hedge fund is sizable (in excess of $1bn). Investors and even other stakeholders also should place a greater focus on what is usually overlooked issue; most notably the credit quality and authenticity of short-term investments bought by their hedge funds. Design/methodology/approach A thorough investigation of a fraud committed by a lawyer against a number of hedge funds. Several important lessons are identified to professionals who conduct due diligence on hedge funds. Findings The details of the case are very remarkable. This case directs investors’ attention to place greater efforts on certain aspects of operational risk and due diligence on not only hedge funds but also other investment managers. Normally investors conduct operational due diligence on the fund and its operations. Investors also vet fund external parties such as prime brokers, custodians, accountants and fund administrators. Yet, investors normally do not suspect the quality of short-term fund investments. In this case, the short-terms investments were the source of unforeseen yet substantial risk. Research limitations/implications Stakeholders in hedge funds need to carefully investigate the issuer of and the quality of short-term investments that a hedge fund invests in. Future research can investigate the association of hedge fund manager failure with a liquidity position of the fund. Practical implications Investors must thoroughly the entirety of the fund including short-term securities. Originality/value Normally, it is the hedge funds that commit the fraud against investors. In this case, it is the multi-billion hedge funds run by sophisticated fund managers, who are the victims.


2002 ◽  
Vol 05 (07) ◽  
pp. 737-756 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANÇOISE CHARPIN ◽  
DOMINIQUE LACAZE

Long-short strategies are now frequently implemented especially by hedge fund managers, or simply by active equity managers. Nevertheless, in the literature, the superiority of long-short strategies on long-only strategies still remains a debated point. A comparison of these strategies requires an efficient-frontier analysis. However such analysis to be relevant must integrate the specific regulation on long-short portfolios which exists on all stock markets. This paper studies the efficient frontier of long-short portfolios taking into account the regulatory constraints. A numerical resolution is proposed using the American regulations. A comparison with leveraged and unleveraged long-only strategies is presented showing the potential benefits of long-short investing.


CFA Digest ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 11-13
Author(s):  
Keith H. Black
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Istvan Nagy ◽  
Ivan Guidotti
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 35-47 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ying Li ◽  
A. Steven Holland ◽  
Hossein B. Kazemi

Author(s):  
Bart Osinga ◽  
Marc Schauten ◽  
Remco C. J. Zwinkels

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.


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