Imitation and mirror self-recognition may be developmental precursors to theory of mind in human and nonhuman primates
1998 ◽
Vol 21
(1)
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pp. 115-115
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Heyes argues that nonhuman primates are unable to imitate, recognize themselves in mirrors, and take another's perspective, and that none of these capabilities are evidence for theory of mind. First, her evaluation of the evidence, especially for imitation and mirror self-recognition, is inaccurate. Second, she neglects to address the important developmental evidence that these capabilities are necessary precursors in the development of theory of mind.
1998 ◽
Vol 21
(1)
◽
pp. 133-134
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Keyword(s):
1998 ◽
Vol 21
(1)
◽
pp. 101-114
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Keyword(s):
2013 ◽
Vol 8
(1)
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pp. 24-38
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1997 ◽
Vol 818
(1 Self Across P)
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pp. 65-71
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2011 ◽
Vol 16
(3)
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pp. 367-383
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1997 ◽
Vol 39
(3)
◽
pp. 266-275
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1995 ◽
Vol 7
(2)
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pp. 196-208
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1994 ◽
pp. 51-60
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